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Can the Seller Benefit from an Insider in Common-Value Auctions?

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References

1981Optimal Auction Design5,938 cited
1982A Theory of Auctions and Competitive Bidding3,770 cited
1984Optimal Auctions with Risk Averse Buyers748 cited
1988An Empirical Study of an Auction with Asymmetric Information348 cited
1983Competitive bidding and proprietary information311 cited
1982The value of information in a sealed-bid auction265 cited
1967Competitive Bidding with Asymmetric Information174 cited
2015AUCTIONS FOR OIL AND GAS LEASES WITH AN INFORMED BIDDER AND A RANDOM RESERVATION PRICE148 cited
1999Common Value Auctions with Insider Information83 cited
1979Note—Competitive Bidding with Asymmetric Information Reanalyzed51 cited

Cited by

2009Asymmetric Information and Adverse Selection in Mauritian Slave Auctions38 cited
2003Private information revelation in common-value auctions37 cited
2003Common Value Auctions and the Winner's Curse34 cited
2020Effect of public procurement regulation on competition and cost-effectiveness21 cited
2005Information Acquisition Under Uncertainty in Credit Markets20 cited

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