A Test of Lazear's Theory of Delayed Payment Contracts

Abstract

According to Lazear, workers and firms enter into long-term implicit contracts that discourage shirking and malfeasance by shifting compensation to the end of the contract. Such "delayed payment" contracts are less likely to occur in jobs in which it is comparatively simple to monitor worker effort. This paper uses data from the National Longitudinal Survey and the Dictionary of Occupational Titles to test that hypothesis. In particular, it tests whether jobs that involve repetitive tasks tend to be characterized by an absence of pensions, mandatory retirement, long job tenures, and high wages for older workers.

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