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The interaction between financial and employment contracts: A formal model of Japanese Corporate Governance
16 references·0 citing·48 second hop
The interaction between financial and employment contracts: A formal model of Japanese Corporate Governance (1992)The interaction between financial and emp…Toward an Economic Model of the Japanese Firm (2013)Toward an Economic Model of t…Incentives to Help in Multi-Agent Situations (1991)Incentives to Help in Multi-A…Performance Pay and Top-Management Incentives (1990)Performance Pay and Top-Manag…The main bank system and corporate monitoring and control in Japan (1989)The main bank system and corp…Pay Equality and Industrial Politics (1989)Pay Equality and Industrial P…Management turnover and financial distress (1989)Management turnover and finan…Implicit Contracts, Incentive Compatibility, and Involuntary Unemployment (1989)Implicit Contracts, Incentive…Agency costs and innovation (1989)Agency costs and innovationEmployment Contracts, Influence Activities, and Efficient Organization Design (1988)Employment Contracts, Influen…Corporate Finance and Corporate Governance (1988)Corporate Finance and Corpora…Corporate Finance and Corporate Governance (1988)Corporate Finance and Corpora…The Existence of Self-Enforcing Implicit Contracts (1987)The Existence of Self-Enforci…The Folk Theorem in Repeated Games with Discounting or with Incomplete Information (1986)The Folk Theorem in Repeated …The Co-operative Game Theory of the Firm. (1985)The Co-operative Game Theory …Credit Markets and the Control of Capital (1985)Credit Markets and the Contro…Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure (1976)Theory of the firm: Manageria…Models of Man. (1959)Reexamination of the perfectness concept for equilibrium points in extensive games (1975)Production, Information Costs and Economic Organization (1996)Relational Contracts and the Nature of Market Interactions (2004)Four formal(izable) theories of the firm? (2005)Can Principals Identify Effective Teachers? Evidence on Subjective Performance Evaluation in Education (2008)Equilibrium in Competitive Insurance Markets: An Essay on the Economics of Imperfect Information (1976)Rank-Order Tournaments as Optimum Labor Contracts (1981)Moral Hazard in Teams (1982)Beyond Becker: Training in Imperfect Labour Markets (1999)Psychological foundations of incentives (2002)Identity and the Economics of Organizations (2005)The Capital Structure Puzzle (1984)Outside directors and CEO turnover (1988)Performance Changes Following Top Management Dismissals (1995)The Importance of Distinguishing Errors from Irregularities in Restatement Research: The Case of Restatements and CEO/CFO Turnover (2008)Creditor rights, information sharing, and bank risk taking (2010)The Nature of the Firm (1937)Economic Action and Social Structure: The Problem of Embeddedness (1985)The Theory of Capital Structure (1991)A Survey of Corporate Governance (1997)The theory and practice of corporate finance: evidence from the field (2001)Markets and Hierarchies: Analysis and Antitrust Implications. (1976)The Economic Institutions of Capitalism (1986)The Economic Institutions of Capitalism (1987)Firm organization, industrial structure, and technological innovation (1996)Financing Innovation: Evidence from R&D Grants (2017)Can the green credit policy stimulate green innovation in heavily polluting enterprises? Evidence from a quasi-natural experiment in China (2021)CAPITAL ASSET PRICES: A THEORY OF MARKET EQUILIBRIUM UNDER CONDITIONS OF RISK* (1964)The Pricing of Options and Corporate Liabilities (1973)Separation of Ownership and Control (1983)Corporate financing and investment decisions when firms have information that investors do not have (1984)Law and Finance (1998)Rational cooperation in the finitely repeated prisoners' dilemma (1982)Reputation and imperfect information (1982)An Introduction to Varieties of Capitalism (2001)Varieties of Capitalism (2001)Evolutionary games on graphs (2007)The Determination of Financial Structure: The Incentive-Signalling Approach (1977)Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs, and Ownership Structure (1979)Financial Development and Economic Growth: Views and Agenda (1999)Finance and Growth: Theory and Evidence (2004)Chapter 12 Finance and Growth: Theory and Evidence (2005)Creating a Strategic Center to Manage a Web of Partners (1995)From Fiefs to Clans and Network Capitalism: Explaining China's Emerging Economic Order (1996)The Handbook of Organizational Economics (2013)The Modern Industrial Revolution, Exit, and the Failure of Internal Control Systems (1993)Higher market valuation of companies with a small board of directors (1996)
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References

  • 1976Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure71,441 cited
  • 1990Performance Pay and Top-Management Incentives5,080 cited
  • 1986The Folk Theorem in Repeated Games with Discounting or with Incomplete Information2,375 cited
  • 1988Corporate Finance and Corporate Governance2,253 cited
  • 1989Agency costs and innovation1,675 cited
  • 1989Pay Equality and Industrial Politics1,205 cited
  • 1985Credit Markets and the Control of Capital1,095 cited
  • 1989Management turnover and financial distress1,001 cited
  • 2013Toward an Economic Model of the Japanese Firm987 cited
  • 1989Implicit Contracts, Incentive Compatibility, and Involuntary Unemployment768 cited
  • 1987The Existence of Self-Enforcing Implicit Contracts656 cited
  • 1988Employment Contracts, Influence Activities, and Efficient Organization Design634 cited
  • 1985The Co-operative Game Theory of the Firm.570 cited
  • 1988Corporate Finance and Corporate Governance539 cited
  • 1991Incentives to Help in Multi-Agent Situations464 cited
  • 1989The main bank system and corporate monitoring and control in Japan

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