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Communication, coordination and Nash equilibrium
8 references·16 citing·44 second hop
Communication, coordination and Nash equilibrium (1988)Communication, coordination and Nash equi…Learning How to Cooperate: Optimal Play in Repeated Coordination Games (1990)Learning How to Cooperate: Op…Collective dynamic consistency in repeated games (1989)Collective dynamic consistenc…Cheap Talk, Coordination, and Entry (1987)Cheap Talk, Coordination, and…Rationalizable Strategic Behavior (1984)Rationalizable Strategic Beha…Rationalizable Strategic Behavior and the Problem of Perfection (1984)Rationalizable Strategic Beha…Mechanism Design by an Informed Principal (1983)Mechanism Design by an Inform…Strategic Information Transmission (1982)Strategic Information Transmi…Subjectivity and correlation in randomized strategies (1974)Subjectivity and correlation …Mutual support in games: Some properties of Berge equilibria (2011)Mutual support in games: Some…When Does Communication Improve Coordination? (2010)When Does Communication Impro…Language, Meaning, and Games: A Model of Communication, Coordination, and Evolution (2008)Language, Meaning, and Games:…Equilibrium refinement vs. level-k analysis: An experimental study of cheap-talk games with private information (2008)Equilibrium refinement vs. le…COMMUNICATION AND INCENTIVE MECHANISMS BASED ON GROUP PERFORMANCE: AN EXPERIMENTAL STUDY OF NONPOINT POLLUTION CONTROL (2006)COMMUNICATION AND INCENTIVE M…An Introduction to Game Theory for Linguists (2006)An Introduction to Game Theor…Strategy, Economic Organization, and the Knowledge Economy (2005)Strategy, Economic Organizati…War, peace, and the size of countries (2004)War, peace, and the size of c…Migration and the evolution of conventions (2004)Migration and the evolution o…Is There a Hold‐up Problem? (2004)Is There a Hold‐up Problem?Co-ordination, Spillovers, and Cheap Talk (2002)Co-ordination, Spillovers, an…Leadership, Beliefs and Coordination: An Explorative Discussion (2001)Leadership, Beliefs and Coord…PAYOFF DOMINANCE AND THE STACKELBERG HEURISTIC (1997)PAYOFF DOMINANCE AND THE STAC…An Evolutionary Approach to Pre-Play Communication (1995)An Evolutionary Approach to P…Signaling future actions and the potential for sacrifice (1992)Signaling future actions and …Communication between rational agents (1990)Communication between rationa…Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result (1973)The Economic Theory of Agency: The Principal's Problem. (1973)Equilibrium in Competitive Insurance Markets: An Essay on the Economics of Imperfect Information (1976)Perfect sequential equilibrium (1986)Competitive equilibrium in the credit market under asymmetric information (1987)A survey of agency models of organizations (1988)Standardization, Compatibility, and Innovation (1985)Action Characteristics as Predictors of Competitive Responses (1992)A Theory of Focal Points (1995)Structural Models of Nonequilibrium Strategic Thinking: Theory, Evidence, and Applications (2013)The Strategy of Conflict (1960)A General Theory of Equilibrium Selection in Games (1988)Evolution and the Theory of Games (1988)Decentralization, Duplication, and Delay (1990)Adaptive Dynamics in Coordination Games (1995)Homo Moralis--Preference Evolution Under Incomplete Information and Assortative Matching (2013)Reexamination of the perfectness concept for equilibrium points in extensive games (1975)The Folk Theorem in Repeated Games with Discounting or with Incomplete Information (1986)On the Theory of Infinitely Repeated Games with Discounting (1988)Chapter 6 Theories of oligopoly behavior (1989)Explicit vs. tacit collusion—The impact of communication in oligopoly experiments (2012)Social Capital and Social Quilts: Network Patterns of Favor Exchange (2012)Non-Cooperative Games (1951)Correlated Equilibrium as an Expression of Bayesian Rationality (1987)Non-cooperative games (1989)Multiagent systems: algorithmic, game-theoretic, and logical foundations (2009)A Behavioral Approach to the Rational Choice Theory of Collective Action Presidential Address, American political Science Association, 1997 (2010)Theory of games and economic behavior (2019)Cheap Talk (1996)Games and Decisions (2015)Job Market Signaling (1973)Signaling Games and Stable Equilibria (1987)Strategic Models of Talk in Political Decision Making (1992)Judicial Modification of Contracts Between Sophisticated Parties: A More Complete View of Incomplete Contracts and Their Breach (1993)Signaling Strategies in Competitive Interaction: Building Reputations and Hiding the Truth (2001)Toward a Theory of the Rent-Seeking Society (1982)Rationalist explanations for war (1995)War and Relatedness (2009)On the dynamics of social conflicts: Looking for the black swan (2013)Stochastic evolutionary differential games toward a systems theory of behavioral social dynamics (2016)Herd Behavior and Investment (1988)Domestic Political Audiences and the Escalation of International Disputes (1994)Equilibrium Selection in Signaling Games (1987)Voluntary disclosure with a strategic opponent (1990)
this work references cited by second hop

References

  • 1982Strategic Information Transmission4,289 cited
  • 1974Subjectivity and correlation in randomized strategies1,630 cited
  • 1984Rationalizable Strategic Behavior and the Problem of Perfection1,407 cited
  • 1984Rationalizable Strategic Behavior1,292 cited
  • 1987Cheap Talk, Coordination, and Entry512 cited
  • 1983Mechanism Design by an Informed Principal434 cited
  • 1990Learning How to Cooperate: Optimal Play in Repeated Coordination Games378 cited
  • 1989Collective dynamic consistency in repeated games241 cited

Cited by

  • 2004War, peace, and the size of countries191 cited
  • 1990Communication between rational agents171 cited
  • 1995An Evolutionary Approach to Pre-Play Communication144 cited
  • 1992Signaling future actions and the potential for sacrifice129 cited
  • 2010When Does Communication Improve Coordination?126 cited
  • 2008Language, Meaning, and Games: A Model of Communication, Coordination, and Evolution125 cited
  • 2005Strategy, Economic Organization, and the Knowledge Economy111 cited
  • 2004Is There a Hold‐up Problem?

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103 cited
  • 2001Leadership, Beliefs and Coordination: An Explorative Discussion102 cited
  • 2002Co-ordination, Spillovers, and Cheap Talk98 cited
  • 2006An Introduction to Game Theory for Linguists88 cited
  • 2008Equilibrium refinement vs. level-k analysis: An experimental study of cheap-talk games with private information81 cited
  • 1997PAYOFF DOMINANCE AND THE STACKELBERG HEURISTIC76 cited
  • 2011Mutual support in games: Some properties of Berge equilibria73 cited
  • 2006COMMUNICATION AND INCENTIVE MECHANISMS BASED ON GROUP PERFORMANCE: AN EXPERIMENTAL STUDY OF NONPOINT POLLUTION CONTROL72 cited
  • 2004Migration and the evolution of conventions67 cited