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Market Research and Market Design
15 references·11 citing·37 second hop
Market Research and Market Design (2003)Market Research and Market DesignImplementation, contracts, and renegotiation in environments with complete information (2008)Implementation, contracts, an…Robust Mechanism Design (2005)Robust Mechanism DesignOptimal Pricing Mechanisms with Unknown Demand (2003)Optimal Pricing Mechanisms wi…Competitive auctions and digital goods (2001)Competitive auctions and digi…Auctions and Privatization (1992)Auctions and PrivatizationA dominant strategy double auction (1992)A dominant strategy double au…The Simple Economics of Optimal Auctions (1989)The Simple Economics of Optim…The rate at which a simple market converges to efficiency as the number of traders increases: An asymptotic result for optimal trading mechanisms (1989)The rate at which a simple ma…Incentive Efficiency of Double Auctions (1985)Incentive Efficiency of Doubl…Monopoly with Incomplete Information (1984)Monopoly with Incomplete Info…Efficient mechanisms for bilateral trading (1983)Efficient mechanisms for bila…Efficient and Durable Decision Rules with Incomplete Information (1983)Efficient and Durable Decisio…Regulating a Monopolist with Unknown Costs (1982)Regulating a Monopolist with …Optimal Auction Design (1981)Optimal Auction DesignCOUNTERSPECULATION, AUCTIONS, AND COMPETITIVE SEALED TENDERS (1961)COUNTERSPECULATION, AUCTIONS,…Making the Most of Your Samples (2018)Making the Most of Your Sampl…Strategy-proofness in the Large (2017)Strategy-proofness in the Lar…Ironing in the Dark (2016)Ironing in the DarkMaking the Most of Your Samples (2015)Making the Most of Your Sampl…Bayesian Mechanism Design (2013)Bayesian Mechanism DesignAuctions with intermediaries (2010)Auctions with intermediariesLimited and online supply and the bayesian foundations of prior-free mechanism design (2009)Limited and online supply and…Information in Mechanism Design (2008)Information in Mechanism Desi…From optimal limited to unlimited supply auctions (2005)From optimal limited to unlim…Competitiveness via consensus (2003)Competitiveness via consensusTruthful and Competitive Double Auctions (2002)Truthful and Competitive Doub…Human behavior and the principle of least effort (1949)A Course in Game Theory (1994)Multi-unit auctions with budget-constrained bidders (2005)On profit-maximizing envy-free pricing (2005)Optimal mechanism design and money burning (2008)The Economics of Welfare (1933)Ironing, Sweeping, and Multidimensional Screening (1998)The Handbook of Organizational Economics (2013)The Problem of Social Cost (1960)Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result (1973)Reexamination of the perfectness concept for equilibrium points in extensive games (1975)Collusive Bidder Behavior at Single-Object Second-Price and English Auctions (1987)The Principal-Agent Relationship with an Informed Principal, II: Common Values (1992)Screening by the Company You Keep: Joint Liability Lending and the Peer Selection Effect (2000)The Economics of Exhaustible Resources (1931)The Economist as Engineer: Game Theory, Experimentation, and Computation as Tools for Design Economics (2002)Inference with an Incomplete Model of English Auctions (2003)Economic Insights from Internet Auctions (2004)The decision and the organization (1965)A Theory of Auctions and Competitive Bidding (1982)Auctions and Bidding (1986)Strategyproof sharing of submodular costs:budget balance versus efficiency (2001)Distributed algorithmic mechanism design (2002)Overcoming Incentive Constraints by Linking Decisions (2007)Prices vs. Quantities (1974)Incentive Compatibility and the Bargaining Problem (1979)Design Competition Through Multidimensional Auctions (1993)Incentives and Organizations in the Public Sector: An Interpretative Review (2002)Games with Incomplete Information Played by “Bayesian” Players, I–III Part I. The Basic Model (1967)Formulation of Bayesian analysis for games with incomplete information (1985)Internet Advertising and the Generalized Second Price Auction: Selling Billions of Dollars Worth of Keywords (2006)An Introduction to the Theory of Mechanism Design (2015)Robustness and Linear Contracts (2015)The interdisciplinary study of coordination (1994)Rationalist explanations for war (1995)Employment Fluctuations with Equilibrium Wage Stickiness (2005)Multiagent systems: algorithmic, game-theoretic, and logical foundations (2009)
this work references cited by second hop

References

  • 1961COUNTERSPECULATION, AUCTIONS, AND COMPETITIVE SEALED TENDERS7,719 cited
  • 1981Optimal Auction Design5,938 cited
  • 1983Efficient mechanisms for bilateral trading2,512 cited
  • 1982Regulating a Monopolist with Unknown Costs1,724 cited
  • 1984Monopoly with Incomplete Information1,144 cited
  • 1983Efficient and Durable Decision Rules with Incomplete Information670 cited
  • 2005Robust Mechanism Design616 cited
  • 1992A dominant strategy double auction612 cited
  • 1989The Simple Economics of Optimal Auctions593 cited
  • 2001Competitive auctions and digital goods268 cited
  • 1992Auctions and Privatization232 cited
  • 1985Incentive Efficiency of Double Auctions228 cited
  • 2008Implementation, contracts, and renegotiation in environments with complete information213 cited
  • 2003Optimal Pricing Mechanisms with Unknown Demand192 cited
  • 1989The rate at which a simple market converges to efficiency as the number of traders increases: An asymptotic result for optimal trading mechanisms157 cited

Cited by

  • 2008Information in Mechanism Design

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75 cited
  • 2002Truthful and Competitive Double Auctions75 cited
  • 2017Strategy-proofness in the Large65 cited
  • 2015Making the Most of Your Samples63 cited
  • 2010Auctions with intermediaries58 cited
  • 2003Competitiveness via consensus56 cited
  • 2018Making the Most of Your Samples51 cited
  • 2005From optimal limited to unlimited supply auctions51 cited
  • 2013Bayesian Mechanism Design46 cited
  • 2016Ironing in the Dark44 cited
  • 2009Limited and online supply and the bayesian foundations of prior-free mechanism design43 cited