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Arguments for–or against–Probabilism?
16 references·16 citing·33 second hopsampled
Arguments for–or against–Probabilism? (2008)Arguments for–or against–Probabilism?Philosophical Theories of Probability (2012)Philosophical Theories of Pro…Accuracy and Coherence: Prospects for an Alethic Epistemology of Partial Belief (2008)Accuracy and Coherence: Prosp…The Oxford Handbook of Rationality (2004)The Oxford Handbook of Ration…Thinking about Mechanisms (2000)Thinking about MechanismsA Nonpragmatic Vindication of Probabilism (1998)A Nonpragmatic Vindication of…Decision Theory as Philosophy (1996)Decision Theory as PhilosophyBetting on Theories (1993)Betting on TheoriesProbability and the Art of Judgment (1992)Probability and the Art of Ju…Clever Bookies and Coherent Beliefs (1991)Clever Bookies and Coherent B…Scientific reasoning: the Bayesian approach (1990)Scientific reasoning: the Bay…Laws and Symmetry (1989)Laws and SymmetryLaws and symmetry (1989)Laws and symmetryThe Logic of Decision. (1984)The Logic of Decision.A Subjectivist’s Guide to Objective Chance (1980)A Subjectivist’s Guide to Obj…On Indeterminate Probabilities (1974)On Indeterminate ProbabilitiesCoherence and the axioms of confirmation (1955)Coherence and the axioms of c…Epistemic Risk and the Demands of Rationality (2022)Epistemic Risk and the Demand…Which Models of Scientific Explanation Are (In)Compatible with Inference to the Best Explanation? (2021)Which Models of Scientific Ex…Four Arguments for Denying that Lottery Beliefs Are Justified (2021)Four Arguments for Denying th…Belief, credence, and moral encroachment (2020)Belief, credence, and moral e…Learning and value change (2019)Learning and value changeSOLVING THE PROBLEM OF LOGICAL OMNISCIENCE (2018)SOLVING THE PROBLEM OF LOGICA…Constraints on Rational Theory Choice (2017)Constraints on Rational Theor…Accuracy, Risk, and the Principle of Indifference (2014)Accuracy, Risk, and the Princ…Epistemic Utility and Norms for Credences (2013)Epistemic Utility and Norms f…Normative theories of argumentation: are some norms better than others? (2012)Normative theories of argumen…GRADATIONAL ACCURACY AND NONCLASSICAL SEMANTICS (2012)GRADATIONAL ACCURACY AND NONC…An `Evidentialist' Worry About Joyce's Argument for Probabilism (2012)An `Evidentialist' Worry Abou…On the Rationality of Belief-Invariance in Light of Peer Disagreement (2011)On the Rationality of Belief-…Generalized Probabilism: Dutch Books and Accuracy Domination (2011)Generalized Probabilism: Dutc…Challenges to Bayesian Confirmation Theory (2011)Challenges to Bayesian Confir…Bayesianism I: Introduction and Arguments in Favor (2011)Bayesianism I: Introduction a…Ontological Relativity and Other Essays (1969)What Conditional Probability Could Not Be (2003)Accuracy and the Laws of Credence (2016)The Structure of Science (1961)Scientific Explanation and the Causal Structure of the World (1985)Discovering complexity: decomposition and localization as strategies in scientific research (1993)Explanation and Understanding (2005)Causal Mechanisms in the Social Sciences (2010)Scientific Explanation and the Causal Structure of the World (2020)The Humean Theory of Motivation (1987)The Possibility of Practical Reason (1996)BELIEF IS CREDENCE ONE (IN CONTEXT) (2013)The Scientific Image (1980)How the Laws of Physics Lie (1983)The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (1984)Four-Dimensionalism (2001)Making Things Happen (2004)Blackwell Handbook of Judgment and Decision Making (2004)Assertion, Knowledge, and Rational Credibility (2006)Numeric, Verbal, and Visual Formats of Conveying Health Risks: Suggested Best Practices and Future Recommendations (2007)A ‘soft’ measure of consensus in the setting of partial (fuzzy) preferences (1988)Permission to Believe: Why Permissivism Is True and What It Tells Us About Irrelevant Influences on Belief (2012)A rational analysis of the selection task as optimal data selection. (1994)Individual differences in rational thought. (1998)How persuasive is a good fit? A comment on theory testing. (2000)Putting Logic in its Place (2004)Belief, credence, and norms (2013)Humean Supervenience debugged (1999)How Models Are Used to Represent Reality (2004)Truth and Truthmakers (2004)Individual differences in reasoning: Implications for the rationality debate? (2000)Representativeness Revisited: Attribute Substitution in Intuitive Judgment (2002)The Affect Heuristic (2002)
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References

  • 2000Thinking about Mechanisms3,178 cited
  • 1989Laws and Symmetry1,821 cited
  • 1989Laws and symmetry1,274 cited
  • 1990Scientific reasoning: the Bayesian approach1,245 cited
  • 1980A Subjectivist’s Guide to Objective Chance799 cited
  • 1998A Nonpragmatic Vindication of Probabilism774 cited
  • 2012Philosophical Theories of Probability596 cited
  • 1974On Indeterminate Probabilities547 cited
  • 1996Decision Theory as Philosophy459 cited
  • 1993Betting on Theories455 cited
  • 1992Probability and the Art of Judgment437 cited
  • 1984The Logic of Decision.383 cited
  • 2008Accuracy and Coherence: Prospects for an Alethic Epistemology of Partial Belief332 cited
  • 1991Clever Bookies and Coherent Beliefs273 cited
  • 1955Coherence and the axioms of confirmation231 cited
  • 2004The Oxford Handbook of Rationality230 cited

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  • 2014Accuracy, Risk, and the Principle of Indifference

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121 cited
  • 2013Epistemic Utility and Norms for Credences73 cited
  • 2011Bayesianism I: Introduction and Arguments in Favor63 cited
  • 2021Four Arguments for Denying that Lottery Beliefs Are Justified56 cited
  • 2018SOLVING THE PROBLEM OF LOGICAL OMNISCIENCE55 cited
  • 2022Epistemic Risk and the Demands of Rationality52 cited
  • 2012An `Evidentialist' Worry About Joyce's Argument for Probabilism48 cited
  • 2011Generalized Probabilism: Dutch Books and Accuracy Domination47 cited
  • 2012Normative theories of argumentation: are some norms better than others?46 cited
  • 2011On the Rationality of Belief-Invariance in Light of Peer Disagreement44 cited
  • 2019Learning and value change42 cited
  • 2012GRADATIONAL ACCURACY AND NONCLASSICAL SEMANTICS38 cited
  • 2020Belief, credence, and moral encroachment37 cited
  • 2011Challenges to Bayesian Confirmation Theory32 cited
  • 2021Which Models of Scientific Explanation Are (In)Compatible with Inference to the Best Explanation?26 cited
  • 2017Constraints on Rational Theory Choice14 cited