Using CEO Succession to Integrate Acquired Organizations: A Contingency Analysis

Abstract

The study proposes that organizations engaged in related acquisition may encourage CEO succession as a mechanism for integrating acquired organizations. Further, we suggest that the risk of CEO succession at the time of acquisition will vary based on the need for integrative action and the power of acquired organizations. Results show that CEO succession is more likely when the participating organizations have incompatible types of ownership and when acquired CEOs have longer tenure than their counterparts. Conversely, the probability of CEO succession is lower among larger acquired organizations. Performance of the acquired organization does not affect the relationship between related acquisition and CEO succession.

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