References

• 1970The Market for "Lemons": Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism22,977 cited
• 1979Moral Hazard and Observability8,358 cited
• 1982Mail and Telephone Surveys: The Total Design Method.6,852 cited
• 1996The Use of Knowledge in Society6,434 cited
• 1979Mail and Telephone Surveys: The Total Design Method.5,023 cited
• 1981The Informational Role of Warranties and Private Disclosure about Product Quality2,491 cited
• 1993A Consumer-Side Experimental Examination of Signaling Theory: Do Consumers Perceive Warranties as Signals of Quality?1,017 cited
• 1988Employment Contracts, Influence Activities, and Efficient Organization Design634 cited
• 1977Consumer Misperceptions, Product Failure and Producer Liability610 cited
• 1990Bargaining costs, influence costs, and the organization of economic activity572 cited
• 1985Product Warranties and Double Moral Hazard368 cited
• 1982The Use of Extrinsic Cues to Facilitate Product Adoption296 cited
• 1989Warranties as Signals under Consumer Moral Hazard288 cited
• 1993Warranty Policy and Extended Service Contracts: Theory and an Application to Automobiles193 cited
• 1986Salesforce Compensation Plans in Environments with Asymmetric Information