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An Example of a Repeated Partnership Game with Discounting and with Uniformly Inefficient Equilibria

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References

1986The Folk Theorem in Repeated Games with Discounting or with Incomplete Information2,375 cited
1986Optimal cartel equilibria with imperfect monitoring668 cited
1979Equilibrium in supergames with the overtaking criterion456 cited
1985Repeated Principal-Agent Games with Discounting383 cited
1986Repeated Partnership Games with Imperfect Monitoring and No Discounting192 cited

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1990Repeated Games with Long-Run and Short-Run Players156 cited
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2012But Who Will Monitor the Monitor?114 cited
2001Multimarket Contact, Imperfect Monitoring, and Implicit Collusion108 cited
2011Recursive Methods in Discounted Stochastic Games: An Algorithm forδ→ 1 and a Folk Theorem107 cited
1986The Internal Economy of Large Firms104 cited
2005Profit sharing and monitoring in partnerships100 cited
2011Projects and Team Dynamics98 cited
2006Efficiency in Repeated Games Revisited: The Role of Private Strategies98 cited
2007Impossibility of Collusion under Imperfect Monitoring with Flexible Production97 cited

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1987Renegotiation-Proof Equilibria: Collective Rationality and Intertemporal Cooperation92 cited

1991Efficiency in partnerships89 cited

1992The Insufficiency of Game Theory for the Resolution of Real-World Collective Action Problems88 cited

2021Folk Theorem in Repeated Games with Private Monitoring88 cited

2013It's the Thought That Counts: The Role of Intentions in Noisy Repeated Games85 cited

2010Fear of Miscoordination and the Robustness of Cooperation in Dynamic Global Games With Exit72 cited