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The Folk Theorem for Repeated Games: A Neu Condition

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References

1986The Folk Theorem in Repeated Games with Discounting or with Incomplete Information2,375 cited
1988On the Theory of Infinitely Repeated Games with Discounting1,259 cited
1990Toward a Theory of Discounted Repeated Games with Imperfect Monitoring1,207 cited
1985Finitely Repeated Games517 cited
1979Equilibrium in supergames with the overtaking criterion456 cited
1995A Folk Theorem for Stochastic Games241 cited
1994Long-Term Competition—A Game-Theoretic Analysis210 cited
1992Repeated Games Played by Overlapping Generations of Players144 cited

Cited by

1999Repeated Games with Differential Time Preferences94 cited
1999Cooperation in Repeated Games When the Number of Stages is not Commonly Known63 cited
2013Efficiency in Games With Markovian Private Information60 cited
2015Cooperation, but No Reciprocity: Individual Strategies in the Repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma57 cited
2007Perfect public equilibrium when players are patient56 cited
2002A Folk Theorem for Repeated Sequential Games55 cited
2012Infinitely repeated games with public monitoring and monetary transfers38 cited

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