Quality, Not Quantity: Strategic Politicians in U.S. Senate Elections, 1952-1990

Abstract

Analyzing senatorial elections between 1952 and 1990, I estimate the impact of challenger experience in various elected offices on vote for the incumbent. Controlling for other factors, U.S. representatives gain a higher proportion of the vote than other elected officials. Consistent with Jacobson's (1990b) theory that the increase in the importance of challenger quality over time in House elections explains the decline in the proportion of marginal House seats, the importance of challenger quality and the proportion of marginal seats remained stable over time in Senate elections. After developing a challenger quality scale based upon the estimated impact of having held different elected offices, I demonstrate that potential senatorial challengers strategically take into account both local and national political and economic conditions when making their candidacy decisions.

Cite this work

No public copy is stored for this record, so only the metadata is cited.

Stored only when both papers are in the corpus — 115 citations exist upstream.

Papers that cite the same references — the relational fallback while embeddings are still backfilling.