Leader–member exchange, subordinate stewardship, and hierarchical governance

Abstract

In this article, by integrating the institutional theory, leader–member exchange (LMX) theory, and stewardship theory, we propose a model of subordinate stewardship behaviors in organizational hierarchies and the resultant hierarchical governance structures. First, we develop propositions suggesting that the quality of LMX (supervisor–subordinate) is determined by three antecedents: leader characteristics, subordinate characteristics, and internal organizational context. The quality of LMX, in turn, affects the subordinate stewardship behaviors. Second, by integrating institutional theory and stewardship theory, we propose that the interaction between isomorphic pressures and the level of subordinate stewardship behaviors may result in four distinct types of hierarchical governance structures: isomorphic stewardship, isomorphic controls, firm-specific controls, and firm-specific stewardship. These governance mechanisms reflect the internal drive toward subordinate stewardship, while complying with the external norms of isomorphism. Thus, different types of governance structures may exist between and within firms. Implications of this model are discussed here.

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