this work references cited by second hop· second hop is a sample of the most-cited connectionsReferences
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- 1985The Structure of Corporate Ownership: Causes and Consequences6,243 cited
- 1990Performance Pay and Top-Management Incentives5,080 cited
- 1982Moral Hazard in Teams4,992 cited
- 1987Aggregation and Linearity in the Provision of Intertemporal Incentives2,870 cited
- 1991Optimal Incentive Contracts in the Presence of Career Concerns: Theory and Evidence1,876 cited
- 1998Are CEOs Really Paid Like Bureaucrats?1,373 cited
- 1997Are CEOs Really Paid Like Bureaucrats?1,291 cited
- 1999The Other Side of the Trade‐Off: The Impact of Risk on Executive Compensation1,037 cited
- 2002The Tenuous Trade‐off between Risk and Incentives996 cited
- 1989Relative Performance Evaluation for Chief Executive Officers954 cited
- 1994Performance Measure Congruity and Diversity in Multi-Task Principal/Agent Relations.914 cited
- 1999Executive Compensation, Strategic Competition, and Relative Performance Evaluation: Theory and Evidence734 cited
- 1986An Empirical Investigation of the Relative Performance Evaluation of Corporate Executives677 cited
- 1994Executive Compensation and Principal-Agent Theory610 cited
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