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Permissions To Do Less Than the Best: A Moving Band1
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  • 2020Aesthetic Reasons and the Demands They (Do Not) Make69 cited
  • 2021The dual scale model of weighing reasons65 cited
  • 2020Non-requiring reasons55 cited
  • 2023The Rules of Rescue45 cited
  • 2021Supererogation and conditional obligation42 cited
  • 2015Satisficing and Motivated Submaximization (in the Philosophy of Religion)39 cited
  • 2016How to think about satisficing37 cited
  • 2019More Seriously Wrong, More Importantly Right34 cited
  • 2020Why formal objections to the error theory fail28 cited
  • 2022Weighing Reasons Against24 cited
  • 2019SELF-OWNERSHIP AND AGENT-CENTERED OPTIONS23 cited
  • 2018Accommodating Options23 cited
  • 2019Agent-Relative Prerogatives and Suboptimal Beneficence23 cited
  • 2022Parity, moral options, and the weights of reasons22 cited
  • 2019Other‐Sacrificing Options*20 cited
  • 2020From rights to prerogatives19 cited

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