Managerial Attributes and Executive Compensation

John Robert Graham · Si Li · Jiaping Qiu

553 citations0/0 files storedReview of Financial Studies

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Corporate Finance and Governance Labor market dynamics and wage inequality Accounting and Organizational Management

Abstract

We study the role of firm- and manager-specific heterogeneities in executive compensation. We decompose the variation in executive compensation and find that time-invariant firm and, especially, manager fixed effects explain a majority of the variation in executive pay. We then show that in many settings, it is important to include fixed effects to mitigate potential omitted variable bias. Furthermore, we find that compensation fixed effects are significantly correlated with management styles (i.e., manager fixed effects in corporate policies). Finally, the method used in the article has a number of potential applications in financial economics. The Author 2011. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of The Society for Financial Studies. All rights reserved. For Permissions, please e-mail: journals.permissions@oup.com., Oxford University Press.

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References

2003Analysis of Panel Data 1999Corporate governance, chief executive officer compensation, and firm performance 1993Human Capital 2003Managing with Style: The Effect of Managers on Firm Policies 1999High Wage Workers and High Wage Firms 1991The Effects of Board Composition and Direct Incentives on Firm Performance 2005Payout policy in the 21st century 2008Back to the Beginning: Persistence and the Cross‐Section of Corporate Capital Structure

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