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Implementation with evidence
16 references·0 citing·39 second hop
Implementation with evidence (2012)Implementation with evidenceStrategic Communication with Lying Costs (2009)Strategic Communication with …Credulity, lies, and costly talk ∗ (2006)Credulity, lies, and costly t…On Optimal Rules of Persuasion (2004)On Optimal Rules of PersuasionChapter 5 Implementation theory (2002)Chapter 5 Implementation theo…Nash Equilibrium and Welfare Optimality (1999)Nash Equilibrium and Welfare …Robust Inference in Communication Games with Partial Provability (1995)Robust Inference in Communica…Implementation in Undominated Strategies: A Look at Bounded Mechanisms (1992)Implementation in Undominated…Virtual Implementation in Nash Equilibrium (1991)Virtual Implementation in Nas…Nash Implementation: A Full Characterization (1990)Nash Implementation: A Full C…Subgame Perfect Implementation (1988)Subgame Perfect ImplementationPartially Verifiable Information and Mechanism Design (1986)Partially Verifiable Informat…Strategic Information Transmission (1982)Strategic Information Transmi…Optimal coordination mechanisms in generalized principal–agent problems (1982)Optimal coordination mechanis…The Informational Role of Warranties and Private Disclosure about Product Quality (1981)The Informational Role of War…Good News and Bad News: Representation Theorems and Applications (1981)Good News and Bad News: Repre…Job Market Signaling (1973)Job Market SignalingCOUNTERSPECULATION, AUCTIONS, AND COMPETITIVE SEALED TENDERS (1961)The Market for "Lemons": Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism (1970)Moral Hazard and Observability (1979)An Analysis of the Principal-Agent Problem (1983)Aggregation and Linearity in the Provision of Intertemporal Incentives (1987)The Theory of Incentives: The Principal-Agent Model (2001)The Economic Theory of Agency: The Principal's Problem. (1973)Optimal Auction Design (1981)Incomplete Contracts: Where do We Stand? (1999)Multiagent systems: algorithmic, game-theoretic, and logical foundations (2009)Income tax evasion: a theoretical analysis (1972)Information Manipulation, Coordination, and Regime Change* (2013)Representative evidence on lying costs (2014)Bayesian Persuasion and Information Design (2019)Reexamination of the perfectness concept for equilibrium points in extensive games (1975)Optimal incentive contracts with multiple agents (1984)Complexity and Renegotiation: A Foundation for Incomplete Contracts (1999)A crash course in implementation theory (2001)Incentives Between Firms (and Within) (2005)Social Choice and Individual Values. (1951)Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result (1973)A Course in Game Theory (1994)Contracts as Reference Points * (2008)Fairness, Responsibility, and Welfare (2008)The Strategy of Conflict (1960)Signaling Games and Stable Equilibria (1987)Herd Behavior and Investment (1988)Domestic Political Audiences and the Escalation of International Disputes (1994)Conflict of Interest and the Credibility of Underwriter Analyst Recommendations (1999)Rationality and Analysts' Forecast Bias (2001)Persuasion by Cheap Talk (2010)Financial Advice (2012)Voluntary disclosure with a strategic opponent (1990)Investor psychology in capital markets: evidence and policy implications (2002)The Economics of Privacy (2016)Equilibrium in Competitive Insurance Markets: An Essay on the Economics of Imperfect Information (1976)Varieties of Capitalism (2001)Signaling Theory: A Review and Assessment (2010)Coordination and discrimination in contracting with externalities: divide and conquer? (2003)
this work references cited by second hop

References

  • 1973Job Market Signaling16,329 cited
  • 1982Strategic Information Transmission4,289 cited
  • 1981Good News and Bad News: Representation Theorems and Applications3,198 cited
  • 1981The Informational Role of Warranties and Private Disclosure about Product Quality2,491 cited
  • 1999Nash Equilibrium and Welfare Optimality1,182 cited
  • 1982Optimal coordination mechanisms in generalized principal–agent problems913 cited
  • 2009Strategic Communication with Lying Costs610 cited
  • 1988Subgame Perfect Implementation463 cited
  • 2006Credulity, lies, and costly talk ∗432 cited
  • 1992Implementation in Undominated Strategies: A Look at Bounded Mechanisms272 cited
  • 1986Partially Verifiable Information and Mechanism Design264 cited
  • 1990Nash Implementation: A Full Characterization240 cited
  • 2004On Optimal Rules of Persuasion191 cited
  • 2002Chapter 5 Implementation theory185 cited
  • 1995Robust Inference in Communication Games with Partial Provability183 cited
  • 1991Virtual Implementation in Nash Equilibrium180 cited

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