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Mechanism design with costly verification and limited punishments
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Mechanism design with costly verification and limited punishments (2020)Mechanism design with costly verification…Optimal Allocation with Ex Post Verification and Limited Penalties (2017)Optimal Allocation with Ex Po…Optimal Allocation with Costly Verification (2014)Optimal Allocation with Costl…Optimal auctions with financially constrained buyers (2013)Optimal auctions with financi…Information Acquisition in Auctions (2000)Information Acquisition in Au…Implementation of Reduced Form Auctions: A Geometric Approach (1991)Implementation of Reduced For…Optimal Auditing, Insurance, and Redistribution (1989)Optimal Auditing, Insurance, …Samurai Accountant: A Theory of Auditing and Plunder (1987)Samurai Accountant: A Theory …Incentive-Compatible Debt Contracts: The One-Period Problem (1985)Incentive-Compatible Debt Con…Optimal Auctions with Risk Averse Buyers (1984)Optimal Auctions with Risk Av…On the Implementability of Reduced Form Auctions (1984)On the Implementability of Re…Optimal Auction Design (1981)Optimal Auction DesignOptimal contracts and competitive markets with costly state verification (1979)Optimal contracts and competi…Ironing, Sweeping, and Multidimensional Screening (1998)Mechanism Design and Approximation (2014)Optimal dynamic mechanism design with deadlines (2015)Redistribution Through Markets (2021)Economically Optimal Performance Evaluation and Control Systems (1980)Honesty and Evasion in the Tax Compliance Game (1994)Comparing Varieties of Agency Theory in Economics, Political Science, and Sociology: An Illustration from State Policy Implementation (1999)Presidential Address, Committing to Commit: Short‐term Debt When Enforcement Is Costly (2004)COUNTERSPECULATION, AUCTIONS, AND COMPETITIVE SEALED TENDERS (1961)Efficient mechanisms for bilateral trading (1983)The interdisciplinary study of coordination (1994)Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach (1968)An Exploration in the Theory of Optimum Income Taxation (1971)Corruption, extortion and evasion (1999)Why do borrowers pledge collateral? New empirical evidence on the role of asymmetric information (2010)Good News and Bad News: Representation Theorems and Applications (1981)A Theory of Auctions and Competitive Bidding (1982)Monotone Comparative Statics (1994)Information Acquisition and Efficient Mechanism Design (2002)Information structures in optimal auctions (2007)Mecro‐Economic Voting: Local Information and Micro‐Perceptions of the Macro‐Economy (2014)Credit Rationing in Markets with Imperfect Information (1981)Reputation Acquisition in Debt Markets (1989)Asymmetric Information, Bank Lending and Implicit Contracts: A Stylized Model of Customer Relationships (1990)The role of capital in financial institutions (1995)Theory of Value (1959)Essays in the Theory of Risk-Bearing. (1972)The Determination of Financial Structure: The Incentive-Signalling Approach (1977)Financial Intermediation and Delegated Monitoring (1984)Agency Costs, Net Worth, And Business Fluctuations (1988)Monitoring and Reputation: The Choice between Bank Loans and Directly Placed Debt (1991)Two Sided Matching: A Study in Game-Theoretic Modeling and Analysis. (1992)Mechanisms With Evidence: Commitment and Robustness (2019)Test Design Under Falsification (2022)Collusion via Signalling in Simultaneous Ascending Bid Auctions with Heterogeneous Objects, with and without Complementarities (2002)On the Equivalence of Bayesian and Dominant Strategy Implementation (2013)Extreme Points and Majorization: Economic Applications (2020)Optimal Selling Strategies under Uncertainty for a Discriminating Monopolist when Demands are Interdependent (1985)How Auctions Work for Wine and Art (1989)The Economist as Engineer: Game Theory, Experimentation, and Computation as Tools for Design Economics (2002)
this work references cited by second hop

References

  • 1981Optimal Auction Design5,938 cited
  • 1979Optimal contracts and competitive markets with costly state verification3,201 cited
  • 1985Incentive-Compatible Debt Contracts: The One-Period Problem1,799 cited
  • 1984Optimal Auctions with Risk Averse Buyers748 cited
  • 1989Optimal Auditing, Insurance, and Redistribution583 cited
  • 2000Information Acquisition in Auctions364 cited
  • 1987Samurai Accountant: A Theory of Auditing and Plunder334 cited
  • 1991Implementation of Reduced Form Auctions: A Geometric Approach150 cited
  • 2014Optimal Allocation with Costly Verification126 cited
  • 2013Optimal auctions with financially constrained buyers115 cited
  • 1984On the Implementability of Reduced Form Auctions96 cited
  • 2017Optimal Allocation with Ex Post Verification and Limited Penalties63 cited

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