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Sequential Persuasion
16 references·5 citing·41 second hop
Sequential Persuasion (2017)Sequential PersuasionBayesian persuasion with multiple senders and rich signal spaces (2017)Bayesian persuasion with mult…Beeps (2016)BeepsBayes correlated equilibrium and the comparison of information structures in games (2016)Bayes correlated equilibrium …Suspense and Surprise (2015)Suspense and SurpriseGiving and Receiving Advice (2013)Giving and Receiving AdviceCompetition in Persuasion (2011)Competition in PersuasionBayesian Persuasion (2011)Bayesian PersuasionOptimal Information Disclosure (2010)Optimal Information DisclosureMulti-Sender Cheap Talk with Restricted State Spaces (2008)Multi-Sender Cheap Talk with …Multiple referrals and multidimensional cheap talk (2002)Multiple referrals and multid…A Model of Expertise (2001)A Model of ExpertiseRelying on the Information of Interested Parties (1986)Relying on the Information of…Existence and Characterization of Perfect Equilibrium in Games of Perfect Information (1985)Existence and Characterizatio…Political resource allocation, controlled agendas, and the status quo (1978)Political resource allocation…Intransitivities in multidimensional voting models and some implications for agenda control (1976)Intransitivities in multidime…Theoretical Economics (1968)Theoretical EconomicsWhen to front-load persuasion (2026)When to front-load persuasionOptimal sequential contests (2024)Optimal sequential contestsInside and Outside Information (2024)Inside and Outside InformationPreparing for the Worst but Hoping for the Best: Robust (Bayesian) Persuasion (2022)Preparing for the Worst but H…Dynamic Persuasion With Outside Information (2018)Dynamic Persuasion With Outsi…Rationality and the Myth of the Maximum (1972)Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result (1973)Legislative leviathan: party government in the House (1993)Veto Players. How Political Institutions Work (2003)Testing Theories of American Politics: Elites, Interest Groups, and Average Citizens (2014)Strategic Information Transmission (1982)Market Distortions When Agents Are Better Informed: The Value of Information in Real Estate Transactions (2008)Estimating the Effect of Hierarchies on Information Use (2009)The Effect of Newspaper Entry and Exit on Electoral Politics (2011)The Quarterly Journal of Economics (2024)The Theory of Committees and Elections. (1959)An agenda for the study of institutions (1986)Diplomacy and domestic politics: the logic of two-level games (1988)Economic Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy (2005)Coalition-Proof Nash Equilibria I. Concepts (1987)Information and Legislative Organization (1991)Modes of Communication (2005)Reputational cheap talk (2006)Bayesian Persuasion and Information Design (2019)Job Market Signaling (1973)Platform Competition in Two-Sided Markets (2003)Position Auctions with Consumer Search (2011)Dynamic Mechanism Design: A Myersonian Approach (2014)An Economic Theory of Political Action in a Democracy (1957)Continuous Auctions and Insider Trading (1985)A Theory of Rational Addiction (1988)Contests for Experimentation (2017)Persuasion of a Privately Informed Receiver (2017)Good News and Bad News: Representation Theorems and Applications (1981)A Theory of Auctions and Competitive Bidding (1982)The Simple Economics of Optimal Persuasion (2017)Political Advertising and Election Results* (2018)Subjectivity and correlation in randomized strategies (1974)Correlated Equilibrium as an Expression of Bayesian Rationality (1987)Information Design, Bayesian Persuasion, and Bayes Correlated Equilibrium (2016)Optimal information disclosure: A linear programming approach (2018)An Economic Approach to Influence Activities in Organizations (1988)Shortcuts Versus Encyclopedias: Information and Voting Behavior in California Insurance Reform Elections (1994)The Economics of Privacy (2016)Promotional Reviews: An Empirical Investigation of Online Review Manipulation (2014)Information Design: A Unified Perspective (2019)
this work references cited by second hop

References

  • 2011Bayesian Persuasion1,913 cited
  • 1976Intransitivities in multidimensional voting models and some implications for agenda control1,340 cited
  • 1978Political resource allocation, controlled agendas, and the status quo1,162 cited
  • 1986Relying on the Information of Interested Parties1,080 cited
  • 2001A Model of Expertise540 cited
  • 2010Optimal Information Disclosure487 cited
  • 2002Multiple referrals and multidimensional cheap talk485 cited
  • 2016Bayes correlated equilibrium and the comparison of information structures in games380 cited
  • 2015Suspense and Surprise303 cited
  • 2011Competition in Persuasion235 cited
  • 1968Theoretical Economics201 cited
  • 2016Beeps200 cited
  • 1985Existence and Characterization of Perfect Equilibrium in Games of Perfect Information163 cited
  • 2008Multi-Sender Cheap Talk with Restricted State Spaces137 cited
  • 2017Bayesian persuasion with multiple senders and rich signal spaces136 cited
  • 2013Giving and Receiving Advice135 cited

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Cited by

  • 2024Optimal sequential contests44 cited
  • 2022Preparing for the Worst but Hoping for the Best: Robust (Bayesian) Persuasion43 cited
  • 2018Dynamic Persuasion With Outside Information34 cited
  • 2024Inside and Outside Information23 cited
  • 2026When to front-load persuasion1 cited