Breaking reality’s constraints on motivated cognition

Abstract

It is thought that wishful thinking is constrained by reality; people cannot believe the utterly implausible simply because they want to. Here, we call into question this basic principle of motivated cognition. We show that certain goals systematically bias judgments in spite of powerful countervailing evidence. This is more than a harmless delusion. Goals can lead to greater endorsement of patently absurd theories (Studies 5 & 6), and impede performance in negotiations (Study 7). These effects only emerge for strong, highly motivated goals: when people have a relatively weak goal for an outcome, reality constrains bias. Not only does this require a revision to the theoretical record, it serves as a cautionary warning to managers and other decision-makers, who are susceptible to the biasing forces of motivation.

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