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The Belief Norm of Academic Publishing
16 references·1 citing·46 second hop
The Belief Norm of Academic Publishing (2023)The Belief Norm of Academic PublishingThe Oxford Handbook of Assertion (2018)The Oxford Handbook of Assert…Idealization and the Aims of Science (2017)Idealization and the Aims of …Philosophy Without Belief (2016)Philosophy Without BeliefKnowledge and the Norm of Assertion (2016)Knowledge and the Norm of Ass…Belief is weak (2015)Belief is weakThe Independence Thesis: When Individual and Social Epistemology Diverge (2011)The Independence Thesis: When…Doxastic Deliberation (2005)Doxastic DeliberationTrue Enough* (2004)True Enough*Do Frequency Representations Eliminate Conjunction Effects? An Exercise in Adversarial Collaboration (2001)Do Frequency Representations …On the Aim of Belief (2000)On the Aim of BeliefKnowledge and Its Limits (2000)Knowledge and Its LimitsKnowledge in a Social World (1999)Knowledge in a Social WorldOn Social Facts (1992)On Social FactsWhy is belief involuntary? (1990)Why is belief involuntary?Epistemic justification: essays in the theory of knowledge (1990)Epistemic justification: essa…Modelling collective belief (1987)Modelling collective beliefPhilosophy, Bullshit, and Peer Review (2023)Philosophy, Bullshit, and Pee…The spandrels of San Marco and the Panglossian paradigm: a critique of the adaptationist programme (1979)The Evolution of Cooperation (1981)Thinking about Mechanisms (2000)Neurocognitive Mechanisms (2020)Perspectival Realism (2022)Philosophy of Open Science (2023)A theory of justice original editionThe Problem of Social Cost (1960)The Market for "Lemons": Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism (1970)Epistemic Injustice (2007)Race and Epistemologies of Ignorance (2007)Epistemic Vigilance (2010)On the psychology of prediction. (1973)Extensional versus intuitive reasoning: The conjunction fallacy in probability judgment. (1983)Experimental practices in economics: A challenge for psychologists? (2000)Individual differences in reasoning: Implications for the rationality debate? (2000)Ambiguity and Self-Evaluation: The Role of Idiosyncratic Trait Definitions in Self-Serving Assessments of Ability (2002)Biased perceptions of income distribution and preferences for redistribution: Evidence from a survey experiment (2012)Meaning (1957)Knowledge and its Limits (2002)Intending is Believing: A Defense of Strong Cognitivism (2018)The relationship between belief and credence (2020)Justifications, Excuses, and Sceptical Scenarios (2025)Minnesota studies in the philosophy of science (1956)Linguistic Communication and Speech Acts. (1982)Reintroducing group selection to the human behavioral sciences (1994)Cooperation, psychological game theory, and limitations of rationality in social interaction (2003)The Philosophy of Sociality (2007)How Truth Governs Belief (2003)A New Argument for Evidentialism (2006)Agency, Shmagency: Why Normativity Won't Come from What Is Constitutive of Action (2006)Conceptual Engineering and Conceptual Ethics (2020)Without Justification (2007)UNREASONABLE KNOWLEDGE (2010)Knowledge‐first functionalism (2019)Conversational Pressure (2020)Epiphanies (2022)Knowledge and Practical Interests (2005)Compassionate Phenomenal Conservatism (2007)Grounding in the image of causation (2015)Self to Self (2005)Strategy, Economic Organization, and the Knowledge Economy (2005)Collective Intentional Behavior from the Standpoint of Semantics* (2007)Epistemic Circularity: Malignant and Benign* (2004)THE REJECTION OF EPISTEMIC CONSEQUENTIALISM (2013)Transparency and Self-Knowledge (2018)
this work references cited by second hop

References

  • 2000Knowledge and Its Limits5,056 cited
  • 1999Knowledge in a Social World2,170 cited
  • 2005Doxastic Deliberation685 cited
  • 2017Idealization and the Aims of Science683 cited
  • 1987Modelling collective belief476 cited
  • 2001Do Frequency Representations Eliminate Conjunction Effects? An Exercise in Adversarial Collaboration449 cited
  • 1990Epistemic justification: essays in the theory of knowledge330 cited
  • 1992On Social Facts302 cited
  • 2018The Oxford Handbook of Assertion239 cited
  • 2015Belief is weak216 cited
  • 2004True Enough*201 cited
  • 1990Why is belief involuntary?179 cited
  • 2000On the Aim of Belief168 cited
  • 2016Knowledge and the Norm of Assertion160 cited
  • 2011The Independence Thesis: When Individual and Social Epistemology Diverge150 cited
  • 2016Philosophy Without Belief129 cited

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  • 2023Philosophy, Bullshit, and Peer Review

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22 cited