The Nature of Rationality

Abstract

Abstract Assessments of heuristic use as rational or irrational can only take place relative to background assumptions about the nature of rationality. Thus this chapter explores common-sense psychology’s (CP’s) understanding of rational decision-making. The chapter sketches two approaches—Classical Rational Choice and Bounded Rationality—and examines the status of heuristic decision-making within each model. In line with work by Gerd Gigerenzer, the instrumental value of heuristics is stressed, but it is argued that (on its own) this is insufficient for nullifying the challenges that heuristic use pose for CP. To see this, the chapter closes by considering the properties that are commonly taken to characterize heuristics, sketching the ‘Dual Process’ or ‘Two System’ approach endorsed by many advocates of the Heuristics and Biases programme. This framework makes clear that heuristic decision-making lies in opposition to the kind of logical processing of mental states where CP has its home.

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