Two Challenges to Common-sense Psychology

Abstract

Abstract Experimental work on ordinary decision-making apparently shows, contra the approach of common-sense psychology (CP), that very often people fail to consult their reasons and instead act on gut-feels and intuitions, plagued by biases and flaws in reasoning. However, while there is general agreement that the experimental work in question undermines the CP approach, getting clear on the precise worry takes work. I identify two distinct objections opponents of CP might have in mind: first, that people do not look to reasons at all when deciding what to do. Second, that people tend not to look to reasons properly. I label these the No Reasons and the Insufficient Reasons challenges. This chapter explores both challenges and sets out the evidence for them.

Cite this work

No public copy is stored for this record, so only the metadata is cited.

Stored only when both papers are in the corpus — 0 citations exist upstream.

Papers that cite the same references — the relational fallback while embeddings are still backfilling.