Rejecting Empirical Evidence of Systematic Irrationality

Abstract

Abstract The Insufficient Reasons challenge to common-sense psychology (CP) holds that individual decision-making is so beset by bias and error, and so impervious to evidence, that it should be viewed as failing to meet the standards for rationality. This chapter presents the first part of the argument against this challenge, exploring the grounds that an advocate of CP has for rejecting the experimental evidence which has been taken to show that we are poor reasoners. The chapter looks at issues around the Replication Crisis and problems with data analysis, test/re-test stability, and other within-subject issues, together with ecological validity concerns, and suggests that these kinds of consideration undermine much of the evidence of apparently irrational decision-making.

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