Heuristics as Rules of Thumb

Abstract

Abstract On one understanding of heuristics, they are ‘rules of thumb’ or ‘cognitive shortcuts’: approximating or associative rules which avoid long-winded logical thinking. This view gives rise to an ‘Insufficient Reasons challenge’ to common-sense psychology (CP), which holds that the way in which we typically handle the search for, and accommodation of, evidence is so poor that heuristic-driven decisions and actions fail to make the grade as rational. This chapter explores this challenge, first by clarifying the claim that heuristic processes are rules of thumb and then by seeing why we might believe that heuristic-based decision-making is flawed. A significant part of the answer to this latter question comes from the realization that our evidence accrual and accommodation practices are subject to a number of biases (such as myside bias), biases which apparently make it more likely that heuristic decision-making relies on systematically weak or flawed evidence.

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