Responding to the Wake-Up Call

Abstract

Prior to the March 2004 riots, there had been little incentive for international decision makers to rock the boat. Kosovo was calm, progress was obviously being made in developing local political capacity, and lots of money was being spent on physical reconstruction, studies, and education. The status quo could continue for another ten years or more, many hoped. The March 2004 riots changed all that. Although sharp disagreement exists about the nature of the riots, it is indisputable that they were spontaneous, at least to a considerable extent, and reflected the impatience and rage of Kosovar Albanians. Claims persist that the violence was orchestrated behind the scenes by clandestine Kosovar Albanian organizations centered on the war veterans. Whether or not that is true, no evidence exists that the senior Kosovar Albanian government officials led them. To the contrary, Rexhepi and Thaçi went out of their way – under considerable international pressure – to call for calm, and they seemed genuinely worried that they might not be able to regain control. It is undeniable that the paroxysm of Kosovar Albanian rage directed against UNMIK and Kosovo Serbs on those two days reflected a deep-seated Albanian frustration with political affairs and with the pace of transition from UN administration of Kosovo to final status. Nearly every Kosovar Albanian interpreted final status to mean independence.

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