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Discretion in Executive Incentive Contracts: Theory and Evidence

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References

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1999Chapter 38 Executive compensation1,569 cited
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1999The firm as a subeconomy567 cited
1996CEO compensation: The role of individual performance evaluation483 cited
2003Optimal Contracting with Subjective Evaluation424 cited
2001Pay for performance? Government regulation and the structure of compensation contracts361 cited
1993Discretion and bias in performance evaluation291 cited
1998The Dependence of pay—Performance Sensitivity on the Size of the Firm254 cited

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2000

The Taxation of Executive Compensation

159 cited

Cited by

2012Information and Employee Evaluation: Evidence from a Randomized Intervention in Public Schools138 cited
2009Performance Measure Properties and Incentive System Design93 cited
2007AUTHORITY, RISK, AND PERFORMANCE INCENTIVES: EVIDENCE FROM DIVISION MANAGER POSITIONS INSIDE FIRMS*91 cited
2018The Politics of Pay: The Unintended Consequences of Regulating Executive Compensation83 cited
2011Dividing the Pie: The Influence of Managerial Discretion Extent on Bonus Pool Allocation*77 cited
2009Boards of Directors, CEO Ownership, and the Use of Non‐Financial Performance Measures in the CEO Bonus Plan77 cited
2000An Analysis of the Relation between the Stewardship and Valuation Roles of Earnings68 cited
2011Evidence on Incentive Effects of Subjective Performance Evaluations54 cited
2004Discretion and bias in performance evaluation: the impact of diversity and subjectivity44 cited
2010Layoffs and Chief Executive Officer (CEO) Compensation: Does CEO Power Influence the Relationship?44 cited
2016Relational contracts with and between agents44 cited
2011The Politics of Pay: A Legislative History of Executive Compensation43 cited
2008Incentive Pay for CEOs in Cooperative Firms30 cited
2015Agency and stewardship attitudes of chief financial officers in private companies29 cited
2018Subjective bonuses and target setting in budget-based incentive contracts28 cited
2019Well It’s Only Fair: How Perceptions of Manager Discretion in Bonus Allocation Affect Intrinsic Motivation25 cited