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An informational perspective on administrative procedures
16 references·16 citing·46 second hopsampled
An informational perspective on administrative procedures (1999)An informational perspective on administr…A Course in Microeconomic Theory (2020)A Course in Microeconomic The…Delegating powers: a transaction cost politics approach to policy making under separate powers (2000)Delegating powers: a transact…Political Control Versus Expertise: Congressional Choices about Administrative Procedures (1995)Political Control Versus Expe…Information and Influence: Lobbying for Agendas and Votes (1993)Information and Influence: Lo…Collusion in Hierarchical Agency (1993)Collusion in Hierarchical Age…Bureaucracy: what government agencies do and why they do it (1990)Bureaucracy: what government …Collective Decisionmaking and Standing Committees: An Informational Rationale for Restrictive Amendment Procedures (1987)Collective Decisionmaking and…Administrative Procedures as Instruments of Political Control (1987)Administrative Procedures as …Hierarchies and Bureaucracies: On the Role of Collusion in Organizations (1986)Hierarchies and Bureaucracies…The Value of Biased Information: A Rational Choice Model of Political Advice (1985)The Value of Biased Informati…The First-Order Approach to Principal-Agent Problems (1985)The First-Order Approach to P…Monopoly with Incomplete Information (1984)Monopoly with Incomplete Info…Congressional Oversight Overlooked: Police Patrols versus Fire Alarms (1984)Congressional Oversight Overl…Bureaucratic Discretion or Congressional Control? Regulatory Policymaking by the Federal Trade Commission (1983)Bureaucratic Discretion or Co…Regulating a Monopolist with Unknown Costs (1982)Regulating a Monopolist with …Optimal coordination mechanisms in generalized principal–agent problems (1982)Optimal coordination mechanis…Linking Corporate Community Programs and Political Strategies (2013)Linking Corporate Community P…Transaction cost regulation (2012)Transaction cost regulationThird-Party Opportunism and the Nature of Public Contracts (2012)Third-Party Opportunism and t…The Politics of Regulation: From New Institutionalism to New Governance (2011)The Politics of Regulation: F…The powers of the Union: delegation in the EU (2008)The powers of the Union: dele…The Institutions of Regulation: An Application to Public Utilities (2008)The Institutions of Regulatio…An Institutional Theory of Public Contracts: Regulatory Implications (2008)An Institutional Theory of Pu…Regulatory Quality Under Imperfect Oversight (2007)Regulatory Quality Under Impe…Consumer capture of regulatory institutions: The creation of public utility consumer advocates in the United States (2006)Consumer capture of regulator…The Institutions of Regulation: An Application to Public Utilities (2005)The Institutions of Regulatio…Administrative Rulemaking: An Old and Emerging Literature (2005)Administrative Rulemaking: An…Policy and process: A game-theoretic framework for the design of non-market strategy (2004)Policy and process: A game-th…Influencing Agencies Through Pivotal Political Institutions (2004)Influencing Agencies Through …The Allocation of Resources by Interest Groups: Lobbying, Litigation and Administrative Regulation (2002)The Allocation of Resources b…Rationales for Government Intervention in the Commercialization of New Technologies (2002)Rationales for Government Int…Academic Earmarks and the Returns to Lobbying (2002)Academic Earmarks and the Ret…The Logic of Collective Action. 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this work references cited by second hop· second hop is a sample of the most-cited connections

References

  • 1990Bureaucracy: what government agencies do and why they do it3,795 cited
  • 1984Congressional Oversight Overlooked: Police Patrols versus Fire Alarms2,936 cited
  • 1987Administrative Procedures as Instruments of Political Control2,229 cited
  • 1982Regulating a Monopolist with Unknown Costs1,724 cited
  • 2020A Course in Microeconomic Theory1,592 cited
  • 1983Bureaucratic Discretion or Congressional Control? Regulatory Policymaking by the Federal Trade Commission1,432 cited
  • 1986Hierarchies and Bureaucracies: On the Role of Collusion in Organizations1,227 cited
  • 1984Monopoly with Incomplete Information1,144 cited
  • 1982Optimal coordination mechanisms in generalized principal–agent problems913 cited
  • 2000Delegating powers: a transaction cost politics approach to policy making under separate powers910 cited
  • 1985The First-Order Approach to Principal-Agent Problems870 cited
  • 1987Collective Decisionmaking and Standing Committees: An Informational Rationale for Restrictive Amendment Procedures631 cited
  • 1995Political Control Versus Expertise: Congressional Choices about Administrative Procedures546 cited
  • 1985The Value of Biased Information: A Rational Choice Model of Political Advice475 cited
  • 1993

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Information and Influence: Lobbying for Agendas and Votes
423 cited
  • 1993Collusion in Hierarchical Agency407 cited
  • Cited by

    • 2008An Institutional Theory of Public Contracts: Regulatory Implications142 cited
    • 2008The powers of the Union: delegation in the EU129 cited
    • 2002Rationales for Government Intervention in the Commercialization of New Technologies116 cited
    • 2005Administrative Rulemaking: An Old and Emerging Literature98 cited
    • 2008The Institutions of Regulation: An Application to Public Utilities93 cited
    • 2013Linking Corporate Community Programs and Political Strategies91 cited
    • 2012Transaction cost regulation90 cited
    • 2007Regulatory Quality Under Imperfect Oversight85 cited
    • 2011The Politics of Regulation: From New Institutionalism to New Governance84 cited
    • 2002Academic Earmarks and the Returns to Lobbying79 cited
    • 2004Influencing Agencies Through Pivotal Political Institutions69 cited
    • 2002The Allocation of Resources by Interest Groups: Lobbying, Litigation and Administrative Regulation60 cited
    • 2012Third-Party Opportunism and the Nature of Public Contracts55 cited
    • 2004Policy and process: A game-theoretic framework for the design of non-market strategy52 cited
    • 2006Consumer capture of regulatory institutions: The creation of public utility consumer advocates in the United States51 cited
    • 2005The Institutions of Regulation: An Application to Public Utilities50 cited