IMAGINED IDEOLOGICAL DIFFERENCES IN CONFLICT ESCALATION AND RESOLUTION

Abstract

There is a tendency for opposing partisans to ideological disputes to imagine that their opponents are extremist, biased, and in diametric opposition to themselves. The current investigation examined the role of these imagined ideological differences in face‐to‐face negotiations. Experiment 1 examined the problems that develop when negotiators attend to irrelevant ideological differences. Dyads who were made aware of political differences, even imagined ones (i.e., their political views were actually similar), required more time to allocate hypothetical funds and perceived their partner less favorably than did dyads who were unaware of their political differences. Experiments 2 and 3 tested the hypothesis that ideological opponents who acquire accurate information about their counterpart's beliefs (thus reducing the effects of imagined ideological differences) will have more successful negotiations. Opposing partisans to abortion (Experiment 2) and the death penalty (Experiment 3) reached more comprehensive, integrative agreements and perceived each other more favorably when they disclosed their own views to each other before negotiating. The relevance of these findings to other mediation techniques and real world conflicts was discussed.

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