What is this thing called ‘commonsense psychology’?

Abstract

Many philosophers ‐ Paul Churchland, among them ‐argue that commonsense psychology in terms of beliefs, desires and intentions is a proto‐science ripe for replacement (or more optimistically, for vindication) by a more mature science. I set out and then criticize three arguments for the conclusion that commonsense psychology is a proto‐science. I try to show that each of these arguments has a false premise that finds its place in a single metaphysical picture that I call “the physicalist picture.” I sketch an alternative picture, “the Practical‐Realist picture,” that is more adequate to the richness of human life. Commonsense psychology is fully integrated into the Practical‐Realist picture. Finally, I consider how my view fits with empirical psychology.

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