Epistemological Beliefs and Reflective Judgement

Abstract

We tested the hypothesis that 4 epistemological beliefs, i.e., beliefs about the nature and acquisition of knowledge, proposed by Schommer in 1990, were related to observed differences in epistemological reasoning. Based on their responses to a philosophical dilemma, 125 college undergraduates and graduate students were assigned to 1 of 7 levels of the Reflective Judgement Model by Kitchener and King. 4 independent epistemological beliefs were used to predict reflective judgement. Analysis indicated that beliefs in Fixed Ability, Simple Knowledge, and Quick Learning accurately discriminated between higher and lower reflective judgement even after age, education, and home environment were controlled. The relative contribution of each belief was examined as well. Practical and theoretical implications were discussed.

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