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Belief-Free Equilibria in Repeated Games

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References

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2018Evolutionary Game Theory: A Renaissance209 cited
2009Community enforcement when players observe partners' past play129 cited
2012But Who Will Monitor the Monitor?114 cited
2006

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The Folk Theorem for Games with Private Almost-Perfect Monitoring

105 cited

2006Efficiency in Repeated Games Revisited: The Role of Private Strategies98 cited

2021Folk Theorem in Repeated Games with Private Monitoring88 cited

2009Belief-Free Equilibria in Games With Incomplete Information59 cited

2015Cooperation, but No Reciprocity: Individual Strategies in the Repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma57 cited

2012A Foundation for Markov Equilibria in Sequential Games with Finite Social Memory47 cited

2016The Allocation of Future Business: Dynamic Relational Contracts with Multiple Agents46 cited

2015The Impact of Monitoring in Infinitely Repeated Games : Perfect, Public, and Private43 cited

2004Purification in the Infinitely-Repeated Prisoners’ \nDilemma41 cited

2010Folk theorems with bounded recall under (almost) perfect monitoring37 cited

n.d.The Folk Theorem for Repeated Games with Observation Costs36 cited

2006Efficiency results in N player games with imperfect private monitoring35 cited

2019Cooperation and Community Responsibility34 cited