The Consequences of Completion: How Level of Completion Influences Information Concealment by Decision Makers

Abstract

Numerous studies have demonstrated that decision makers will allocate additional resources to failing projects if those projects are close to completion, as opposed to far from completion. The present work considers whether high project completion leads to other effects; namely, decision-maker willingness to conceal negative information about a project. Three studies (1 at the group level, 2 at the individual level; 1 using qualitative data, 2 using quantitative data) established a link between project completion, incremental investment behavior, and the tendency to conceal negative information.

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