The effects of competition on allocators' preferences for contributive and retributive justice rules

Abstract

Abstract A 2 × 2 × 3 factorial design was employed to test the effects of competition on justice rule preferences in contributive and retributive settings. The factors included task structure (cooperative versus competitive); allocation (contributive versus retributive); and input information (no information, ability only, effort only). The data showed that, in contribution conditions, competition alone was insufficient to produce changes in allocation preferences. However, in the contribution‐ability condition, competition produced a shift toward more equitable allocations. In retribution situations, competition was sufficient to create stronger preferences for equity in all conditions except retribution‐ability. In general, allocators in competitive conditions exhibited a stronger preference for equity. In particular, the combination of competition and retribution produced the strongest preference for equitable allocations.

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