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Transitional attitudes and the unmooring view of higher‐order evidence
16 references·1 citing·37 second hop
Transitional attitudes and the unmooring view of higher‐order evidence (2021)Transitional attitudes and the unmooring …The Epistemic Role of Consciousness (2019)The Epistemic Role of Conscio…Rationality’s Fixed Point (or: In Defense of Right Reason) (2015)Rationality’s Fixed Point (or…One and Done? Optimal Decisions From Very Few Samples (2014)One and Done? Optimal Decisio…The Epistemology of Disagreement (2013)The Epistemology of Disagreem…Epistemic Akrasia (2013)Epistemic AkrasiaMoore’s Paradox and the Accessibility of Justification (2011)Moore’s Paradox and the Acces…Improbable Knowing (2011)Improbable KnowingHow to Disagree about How to Disagree (2010)How to Disagree about How to …Higher‐Order Evidence 1 (2010)Higher‐Order Evidence 1Reflection and Disagreement (2007)Reflection and DisagreementEpistemology of Disagreement: The Good News (2007)Epistemology of Disagreement:…The Epistemic Significance of Disagreement (2005)The Epistemic Significance of…Faith, Freedom, and Rationality (1999)Faith, Freedom, and Rationali…What is Justified Belief? (1979)What is Justified Belief?Are Epistemic Concepts Reducible to Ethical Concepts? (1978)Are Epistemic Concepts Reduci…On the Principle of Total Evidence (1967)On the Principle of Total Evi…Higher-Order Evidence and Calibrationism (2022)Higher-Order Evidence and Cal…Discrimination and Perceptual Knowledge (1976)What Is "Naturalized Epistemology?" (1988)Metaepistemology and Skepticism (1990)Expanding the Dimensions of Epistemic Cognition: Arguments From Philosophy and Psychology (2011)Contemporary Theories of Knowledge. (1988)YOU JUST BELIEVE THAT BECAUSE…1 (2010)Permission to Believe: Why Permissivism Is True and What It Tells Us About Irrelevant Influences on Belief (2012)The Conflict of Evidence and Coherence (2015)The Advancement of Science: Science without Legend, Objectivity without Illusions. (1995)Warranted Christian Belief (2000)Epistemic Permissiveness (2005)Peer Disagreement and Higher‐Order Evidence (2010)The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (1963)The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (1963)Disagreement as Evidence: The Epistemology of Controversy (2009)The Logic of Scientific Discovery (2013)Fake News and Partisan Epistemology (2017)Rational choice and the structure of the environment. (1956)Individual Choice Behavior (1962)Judgment under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases (1974)Unpacking the exploration–exploitation tradeoff: A synthesis of human and animal literatures. (2015)A meta-analytic review of two modes of learning and the description-experience gap. (2017)The anchoring bias reflects rational use of cognitive resources (2017)What We Owe to Each Other (2000)Knowledge and its Limits (2002)Internal and External Reasons (2008)Ideal rationality and logical omniscience (2015)Enkrasia or evidentialism? Learning to love mismatch (2018)Justifications, Excuses, and Sceptical Scenarios (2025)Slightly More Realistic Personal Probability (1967)Homo Heuristicus: Why Biased Minds Make Better Inferences (2009)Publication bias and the canonization of false facts (2016)Affective Experience, Desire, and Reasons for Action (2019)Confidence in consciousness research (2022)Kant's Reason (2023)Recent Work in Virtue Epistemology (1997)Reasons First (2021)
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References

  • 1979What is Justified Belief?1,526 cited
  • 2007Epistemology of Disagreement: The Good News984 cited
  • 2007Reflection and Disagreement660 cited
  • 2005The Epistemic Significance of Disagreement597 cited
  • 2014One and Done? Optimal Decisions From Very Few Samples501 cited
  • 2019The Epistemic Role of Consciousness424 cited
  • 2010Higher‐Order Evidence 1386 cited
  • 1967On the Principle of Total Evidence329 cited
  • 1978Are Epistemic Concepts Reducible to Ethical Concepts?323 cited
  • 2015Rationality’s Fixed Point (or: In Defense of Right Reason)303 cited
  • 2011Moore’s Paradox and the Accessibility of Justification275 cited
  • 1999Faith, Freedom, and Rationality258 cited
  • 2010How to Disagree about How to Disagree222 cited
  • 2013The Epistemology of Disagreement206 cited
  • 2013Epistemic Akrasia200 cited
  • 2011Improbable Knowing198 cited

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  • 2022Higher-Order Evidence and Calibrationism

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27 cited