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Anticipated Adjudication: An Analysis of the Judicialization of the US Administrative State
16 references·0 citing·37 second hop
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References

  • 1887The Study of Administration2,542 cited
  • 1987Administrative Procedures as Instruments of Political Control2,229 cited
  • 1983Bureaucratic Discretion or Congressional Control? Regulatory Policymaking by the Federal Trade Commission1,432 cited
  • 1989Structure and Process, Politics and Policy: Administrative Arrangements and the Political Control of Agencies1,208 cited
  • 1961Administrative law review634 cited
  • 1989A Theory of Political Control and Agency Discretion605 cited
  • 1985Control and Feedback in Economic Regulation: The Case of the NLRB545 cited
  • 2008The Politics of Presidential Appointments540 cited
  • 1990Congressional Influence on Bureaucracy501 cited
  • 1985The New Direction in American Politics438 cited
  • 1996Who Controls the Bureaucracy?: Presidential Power, Congressional Dominance, Legal Constraints, and Bureaucratic Autonomy in a Model of Multi-Institutional Policy-Making404 cited
  • 1983Public Administrative Theory and the Separation of Powers277 cited
  • 2001Interest Groups, Advisory Committees, and Congressional Control of the Bureaucracy232 cited
  • 1997The strategic presidency: hitting the ground running224 cited
  • 1986Agenda Control, Organizational Structure, and Bureaucratic Politics

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209 cited
  • 1975The Descriptive Analysis of Power195 cited
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