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Stakeholder Pressure and the Structure of Executive Compensation · Study

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PreprintStakeholder Pressure and the Structure of Executive Compensation

Marilyn F. Johnson1997

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Preprintgreen1997

Stakeholder Pressure and the Structure of Executive Compensation

Marilyn F. Johnson · Margaret B. Shackell

71 citations·0/0 files stored·SSRN Electronic Journal

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Corporate Finance and Governance Accounting and Organizational Management Corporate Governance and Financial Management

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References

1993Additional evidence on the association between the investment opportunity set and corporate financing, dividend, and compensation policies 1987An Analysis of the use of Accounting and Market Measures of Performance in Executive Compensation Contracts 1989Relative Performance Evaluation for Chief Executive Officers 1993Accounting earnings and top executive compensation 1996Corporate governance and shareholder initiatives: Empirical evidence 1986An Empirical Investigation of the Relative Performance Evaluation of Corporate Executives 1996CEO compensation: The role of individual performance evaluation 1996Investment opportunities and the structure of executive compensation

Cited by

2001Executive Compensation in America: Optimal Contracting or Extraction of Rents?2013Does Say‐on‐Pay Matter? Evidence from Say‐on‐Pay Proposals in the United States 2014Quelle marge de manoeuvre pour l'engagement socialement responsable des dirigeants ? Enjeux et perspectives du gouvernement d'entreprise 2007Tax incentives for inefficient executive pay and reward for luck 2005

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1999Performance Evaluation and Compensation Research: An Agency Perspectivearticle · 7 shared references 2002Price vs. Non-Price Performance Measures in Optimal CEO Compensation Contractspreprint · 7 shared references 2000Are Performance Measures Other than Price Important to CEO Incentives?preprint · 7 shared references 2003Price versus Non-Price Performance Measures in Optimal CEO Compensation Contractsarticle · 6 shared references 1998Accounting earnings and executive compensation:article · 6 shared references 2017Executive Compensation: A Survey of Theory and Evidencepreprint · 6 shared references

Details

Year1997

Typepreprint

Published1997-01-01

VenueSSRN Electronic Journal

ISSN-L1556-5068

Languageen

Citations71

Files0 public / 0

ShelfCorporate Finance and Governance

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doi10.2139/ssrn.41780

openalex_workW1546583803

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Explaining firm willingness to forfeit tax deductions under Internal Revenue Code Section 162(m): The million-dollar cap

2011Effect of the Sarbanes–Oxley act on CEOs’ stock ownership and pay-performance sensitivity

2014Say-on-Pay in a Context of Concentrated Ownership. Evidence from Italy

2008The effect of Internal Revenue Code section 162(m) on the issuance of stock options