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Reasons as the Unity Among the Varieties of Goodness
16 references·0 citing·30 second hop
Reasons as the Unity Among the Varieties of Goodness (2015)Reasons as the Unity Among the Varieties …A Very Good Reason to Reject the Buck-Passing Account (2013)A Very Good Reason to Reject …Transmission and the Wrong Kind of Reason (2012)Transmission and the Wrong Ki…Against Absolute Goodness (2012)Against Absolute GoodnessOxford Studies in Metaethics (2011)Oxford Studies in MetaethicsThe Domain of Reasons (2010)The Domain of ReasonsNo Good Fit: Why the Fitting Attitude Analysis of Value Fails (2009)No Good Fit: Why the Fitting …Buck‐Passing Accounts of Value (2009)Buck‐Passing Accounts of ValueThe Right Kind of Solution to the Wrong Kind of Reason Problem (2008)The Right Kind of Solution to…Fitting Attitudes and Welfare (2008)Fitting Attitudes and WelfareSlaves of the Passions (2007)Slaves of the PassionsThe reasons that matter (2006)The reasons that matterMetaethics after Moore (2006)Metaethics after MooreValue, reasons and the structure of justification: how to avoid passing the buck (2005)Value, reasons and the struct…The Strike of the Demon: On Fitting Pro‐attitudes and Value (2004)The Strike of the Demon: On F…Reasons (2004)ReasonsShould we pass the buck? (2000)Should we pass the buck?11. Reasons and Persons (1986)Value in ethics and economics (1994)What We Owe to Each Other (2000)Epistemic Partiality in Friendship (2006)The Nature of Normativity (2007)Wise Choices, Apt Feelings (1990)The Moralistic Fallacy: On the 'Appropriateness' of Emotions (2000)The Ubiquity of State-Given Reasons (2012)Reasons First (2021)Foundations of Ethics. (1940)Kant, Duty and Moral Worth (2005)The normativity of artefacts (2006)The Normative and the Evaluative (2019)Why There Is Really No Such Thing as the Theory of Motivation (2021)The moral fixed points: new directions for moral nonnaturalism (2014)Reasons as Premises of Good Reasoning (2015)Fittingness First (2016)The Value-Based Theory of Reasons (2016)Response-Dependent Responsibility; or, A Funny Thing Happened on the Way to Blame (2017)The Deontic, the Evaluative, and the Fitting (2022)Ethical Non-Naturalism and the Metaphysics of Supervenience (2012)MORAL DISAGREEMENT AND MORAL SKEPTICISM (2014)Being For (2008)A Fresh Start for the Objective-List Theory of Well-Being (2013)Does Rationality Give Us Reasons?1 (2005)Belief, Credence, and Pragmatic Encroachment 1 (2012)Against Grounding Necessitarianism (2014)Fake News and Partisan Epistemology (2017)To Do, To Die, To Reason Why (2020)Target Centred Virtue Ethics (2021)
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References

  • 2004The Strike of the Demon: On Fitting Pro‐attitudes and Value721 cited
  • 2007Slaves of the Passions717 cited
  • 2010The Domain of Reasons377 cited
  • 2011Oxford Studies in Metaethics335 cited
  • 2004Reasons333 cited
  • 2012Against Absolute Goodness309 cited
  • 2006Metaethics after Moore285 cited
  • 2012Transmission and the Wrong Kind of Reason274 cited
  • 2009No Good Fit: Why the Fitting Attitude Analysis of Value Fails170 cited
  • 2000Should we pass the buck?118 cited
  • 2008Fitting Attitudes and Welfare114 cited
  • 2006The reasons that matter76 cited
  • 2009Buck‐Passing Accounts of Value75 cited
  • 2013A Very Good Reason to Reject the Buck-Passing Account70 cited
  • 2008The Right Kind of Solution to the Wrong Kind of Reason Problem66 cited
  • 2005Value, reasons and the structure of justification: how to avoid passing the buck65 cited

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