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Signaling future actions and the potential for sacrifice

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References

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1988Communication, coordination and Nash equilibrium209 cited

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1993Analytic Uncertainty and International Cooperation: Theory and Application to International Economic Policy Coordination101 cited
1994Advertising and Coordination

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1996Strategic Rationality Orderings and the Best Rationalization Principle78 cited

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2002Why Sunk Costs Matter for Bargaining Outcomes: An Evolutionary Approach58 cited

2017Is increasing inequality harmful? Experimental evidence57 cited

2012Forward induction reasoning revisited54 cited

2003Admissibility and common belief52 cited

2009Signaling Games48 cited

2009Cognitive forward induction and coordination without common knowledge: An experimental study45 cited

2011Network architecture, salience and coordination43 cited

2004Burning money and (pseudo) first-mover advantages: an experimental study on forward induction41 cited

1998Communication, Risk, and Efficiency in Games41 cited