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Political Control Versus Expertise: Congressional Choices about Administrative Procedures
9 references·16 citing·39 second hop
Political Control Versus Expertise: Congressional Choices about Administrative Procedures (1995)Political Control Versus Expertise: Congr…The Politics of Regulation (2021)The Politics of RegulationPolitical Institutions: The Neglected Side of the Story (1990)Political Institutions: The N…Structure and Process, Politics and Policy: Administrative Arrangements and the Political Control of Agencies (1989)Structure and Process, Politi…A Theory of Political Control and Agency Discretion (1989)A Theory of Political Control…Administrative Procedures as Instruments of Political Control (1987)Administrative Procedures as …Congressional Oversight Overlooked: Police Patrols versus Fire Alarms (1984)Congressional Oversight Overl…Bureaucratic Discretion or Congressional Control? Regulatory Policymaking by the Federal Trade Commission (1983)Bureaucratic Discretion or Co…Regulating a Monopolist with Unknown Costs (1982)Regulating a Monopolist with …The Logic of Collective Action. (1966)The Logic of Collective Actio…The rise of the unelected: democracy and the new separation of powers (2008)The rise of the unelected: de…Coercion Through IOs: The Security Council and the Logic of Information Transmission (2006)Coercion Through IOs: The Sec…Political Control and the Power of the Agent (2005)Political Control and the Pow…Spatial Models of Delegation (2004)Spatial Models of DelegationGoal Ambiguity in U.S. Federal Agencies (2004)Goal Ambiguity in U.S. Federa…Desperately Seeking Selznick: Cooptation and the Dark Side of Public Management in Networks (2004)Desperately Seeking Selznick:…Bureaucratic Capacity, Delegation, and Political Reform (2004)Bureaucratic Capacity, Delega…Policing the Bargain: Coalition Government and Parliamentary Scrutiny (2003)Policing the Bargain: Coaliti…The European Commission and the integration of Europe: images of governance (2002)The European Commission and t…T HEORIES OF D ELEGATION (2001)T HEORIES OF D ELEGATIONLegislatures and Statutory Control of Bureaucracy (2001)Legislatures and Statutory Co…Leadership and Pandering: A Theory of Executive Policymaking (2001)Leadership and Pandering: A T…Keeping Tabs on Partners: The Logic of Delegation in Coalition Governments (2001)Keeping Tabs on Partners: The…Comparing Varieties of Agency Theory in Economics, Political Science, and Sociology: An Illustration from State Policy Implementation (1999)Comparing Varieties of Agency…Administrative Procedures and Political Control of the Bureaucracy (1998)Administrative Procedures and…Administrative Procedures, Information, and Agency Discretion (1994)Administrative Procedures, In…Congress: The Electoral Connection, by David R. Mayhew (1975)The New Economics of Organization (1984)Delegation, agency, and agenda setting in the European Community (1997)Conditional logit analysis of qualitative choice behavior (1972)Toward a More General Theory of Regulation (1976)Legislative leviathan: party government in the House (1993)The Politics, Power, and Pathologies of International Organizations (1999)The Evolution of Cooperation (1981)The Economic Institutions of Capitalism (1987)The New Institutionalism in Organizational Analysis. (1993)Institutional Perspectives on Political Institutions (1996)Theory and Practice of Delegation to Non-Majoritarian Institutions (2002)Retrospective Voting in American National Elections. By Morris P. Fiorina. (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1981. Pp. xii + 249. $35.00, cloth; $9.95, paper.) (1982)Incumbent performance and electoral control (1986)Elections and Macroeconomic Policy Cycles (1988)Open-Door or Closed-Door? Transparency in Domestic and International Bargaining (2004)Media Bias and Reputation (2005)A Political Theory of Populism * (2012)Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result (1973)Prices vs. Quantities (1974)Incentive Compatibility and the Bargaining Problem (1979)Monopoly with Incomplete Information (1984)Design Competition Through Multidimensional Auctions (1993)Incentives and Organizations in the Public Sector: An Interpretative Review (2002)Social Choice and Individual Values. (1951)Congress: Keystone of the Washington Establishment (1977)The Path to European Integration (1996)Veto Players. How Political Institutions Work (2003)Delegating powers: a transaction cost politics approach to policy making under separate powers (2000)Environmental Policy and Technological Change (2002)The Engines of European Integration (2003)The Dynamics of Political Control of the Bureaucracy (1991)Delegation to International Organizations: Agency Theory and World Bank Environmental Reform (2003)A Bias Towards Business? Assessing Interest Group Influence on the U.S. Bureaucracy (2005)Introduction: epistemic communities and international policy coordination (1992)Varieties of Participation in Complex Governance (2006)Higher Education: Handbook of Theory and Research (2007)Social Theory of International Politics (1999)Increasing Returns, Path Dependence, and the Study of Politics (2000)
this work references cited by second hop

References

  • 1966The Logic of Collective Action.11,364 cited
  • 1984Congressional Oversight Overlooked: Police Patrols versus Fire Alarms2,936 cited
  • 1987Administrative Procedures as Instruments of Political Control2,229 cited
  • 1982Regulating a Monopolist with Unknown Costs1,724 cited
  • 1983Bureaucratic Discretion or Congressional Control? Regulatory Policymaking by the Federal Trade Commission1,432 cited
  • 1989Structure and Process, Politics and Policy: Administrative Arrangements and the Political Control of Agencies1,208 cited
  • 2021The Politics of Regulation1,085 cited
  • 1990Political Institutions: The Neglected Side of the Story1,056 cited
  • 1989A Theory of Political Control and Agency Discretion605 cited

Cited by

  • 2001Leadership and Pandering: A Theory of Executive Policymaking515 cited
  • 2001Keeping Tabs on Partners: The Logic of Delegation in Coalition Governments461 cited
  • 2001T HEORIES OF D ELEGATION450 cited
  • 1994Administrative Procedures, Information, and Agency Discretion447 cited
  • 2004Bureaucratic Capacity, Delegation, and Political Reform352 cited
  • 2003Policing the Bargain: Coalition Government and Parliamentary Scrutiny

Only edges whose both ends are imported exist here. Widen the year window, or show the whole map. Back to the work

343 cited
  • 2004Goal Ambiguity in U.S. Federal Agencies331 cited
  • 2002The European Commission and the integration of Europe: images of governance329 cited
  • 2004Desperately Seeking Selznick: Cooptation and the Dark Side of Public Management in Networks310 cited
  • 2006Coercion Through IOs: The Security Council and the Logic of Information Transmission297 cited
  • 2001Legislatures and Statutory Control of Bureaucracy287 cited
  • 2004Spatial Models of Delegation285 cited
  • 1998Administrative Procedures and Political Control of the Bureaucracy281 cited
  • 2005Political Control and the Power of the Agent249 cited
  • 2008The rise of the unelected: democracy and the new separation of powers248 cited
  • 1999Comparing Varieties of Agency Theory in Economics, Political Science, and Sociology: An Illustration from State Policy Implementation244 cited