SZodixStudyAcademic Library
ShelvesOpen access
Study · an open academic library·Metadata from OpenAlex (CC0)·Shelves·OpenAlex metadata, de-duplicated
How much discretion for risk regulators?
16 references·2 citing·44 second hop
How much discretion for risk regulators? (2012)How much discretion for risk regulators?The Oxford handbook of political economy (2007)The Oxford handbook of politi…Deliberate discretion?: the institutional foundations of bureaucratic autonomy (2003)Deliberate discretion?: the i…The Theory of Incentives (2002)The Theory of IncentivesThe Theory of Incentives: The Principal-Agent Model (2001)The Theory of Incentives: The…Delegating Powers (1999)Delegating PowersFormal and Real Authority in Organizations (1997)Formal and Real Authority in …A theory of incentives in procurement and regulation (1994)A theory of incentives in pro…A Theory of Incentives in Procurement and Regulation (1993)A Theory of Incentives in Pro…Protection For Sale (1992)Protection For SaleStructure and Process, Politics and Policy: Administrative Arrangements and the Political Control of Agencies (1989)Structure and Process, Politi…The Industrial Organization of Congress; or, Why Legislatures, Like Firms, Are Not Organized as Markets (1988)The Industrial Organization o…Administrative Procedures as Instruments of Political Control (1987)Administrative Procedures as …The Optimal Degree of Commitment to an Intermediate Monetary Target (1985)The Optimal Degree of Commitm…Congressional Oversight Overlooked: Police Patrols versus Fire Alarms (1984)Congressional Oversight Overl…Bureaucratic Discretion or Congressional Control? Regulatory Policymaking by the Federal Trade Commission (1983)Bureaucratic Discretion or Co…Regulating a Monopolist with Unknown Costs (1982)Regulating a Monopolist with …The Influence of Individual Characteristics and Institutional Norms on Bureaucrats’ Use of Cost–Benefit Analysis: A Choice Experiment (2020)The Influence of Individual C…The Rise of NGO Activism (2019)The Rise of NGO ActivismThe Market for "Lemons": Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism (1970)Job Market Signaling (1973)Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure (1976)The Economics of Governance (2005)A “Selection Model” of Political Representation* (2009)Introduction to Multi-Armed Bandits (2019)The Logic of Collective Action (1965)The analysis of household surveys (1997)Uncertainty about Government Policy and Stock Prices (2012)Political uncertainty and risk premia (2013)The Logic of Collective Action. (1966)Congress: The Electoral Connection, by David R. Mayhew (1975)The New Economics of Organization (1984)Political Institutions: The Neglected Side of the Story (1990)Delegation, agency, and agenda setting in the European Community (1997)Delegating powers: a transaction cost politics approach to policy making under separate powers (2000)Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result (1973)Prices vs. Quantities (1974)Incentive Compatibility and the Bargaining Problem (1979)Monopoly with Incomplete Information (1984)Design Competition Through Multidimensional Auctions (1993)Incentives and Organizations in the Public Sector: An Interpretative Review (2002)Markets and Hierarchies: Analysis and Antitrust Implications. (1976)The Costs and Benefits of Ownership: A Theory of Vertical and Lateral Integration (1986)Property Rights and the Nature of the Firm (1990)Inequality and Economic Growth: The Perspective of the New Growth Theories (1999)Intrinsic and Extrinsic Motivation (2003)Does function follow organizational form? Evidence from the lending practices of large and small banks (2005)A Positive Theory of Monetary Policy in a Natural-Rate Model (1981)Reputation and imperfect information (1982)International Norm Dynamics and Political Change (1998)The Science of Monetary Policy: A New Keynesian Perspective (1999)Varieties of Capitalism (2001)Social Choice and Individual Values. (1951)Congress: Keystone of the Washington Establishment (1977)The Path to European Integration (1996)Veto Players. How Political Institutions Work (2003)Crossing the great divide: Coproduction, synergy, and development (1996)Information and the Change in the Paradigm in Economics (2002)Incomplete Contracts: Where do We Stand? (1999)Optimal Nonparametric Estimation of First-price Auctions (2000)Auctions for conservation contracts: an empirical examination of Victoria's BushTender trial (2003)Detrimental effects of sanctions on human altruism (2003)The company of strangers: a natural history of economic life (2004)
this work references cited by second hop

References

  • 1985The Optimal Degree of Commitment to an Intermediate Monetary Target3,687 cited
  • 1992Protection For Sale3,302 cited
  • 1997Formal and Real Authority in Organizations3,119 cited
  • 1993A Theory of Incentives in Procurement and Regulation3,005 cited
  • 1984Congressional Oversight Overlooked: Police Patrols versus Fire Alarms2,936 cited
  • 1994A theory of incentives in procurement and regulation2,554 cited
  • 1987Administrative Procedures as Instruments of Political Control2,229 cited
  • 2002The Theory of Incentives2,116 cited
  • 2001The Theory of Incentives: The Principal-Agent Model2,041 cited
  • 1982Regulating a Monopolist with Unknown Costs1,724 cited
  • 1988The Industrial Organization of Congress; or, Why Legislatures, Like Firms, Are Not Organized as Markets1,527 cited
  • 1983Bureaucratic Discretion or Congressional Control? Regulatory Policymaking by the Federal Trade Commission1,432 cited
  • 2007The Oxford handbook of political economy1,331 cited
  • 1989Structure and Process, Politics and Policy: Administrative Arrangements and the Political Control of Agencies1,208 cited
  • 1999Delegating Powers1,054 cited

Only edges whose both ends are imported exist here. Widen the year window, or show the whole map. Back to the work

  • 2003Deliberate discretion?: the institutional foundations of bureaucratic autonomy904 cited
  • Cited by

    • 2019The Rise of NGO Activism36 cited
    • 2020The Influence of Individual Characteristics and Institutional Norms on Bureaucrats’ Use of Cost–Benefit Analysis: A Choice Experiment5 cited