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A Principal-Agent Theory Approach to Public Expenditure Management Systems in Developing Countries
16 references·0 citing·47 second hop
A Principal-Agent Theory Approach to Public Expenditure Management Systems in Developing Countries (2006)A Principal-Agent Theory Approach to Publ…The State in Africa: The Politics of the Belly (2009)The State in Africa: The Poli…Local Capture: Evidence from a Central Government Transfer Program in Uganda (2004)Local Capture: Evidence from …The Theory of Incentives (2002)The Theory of IncentivesEconomic policy reform : the second stage (2000)Economic policy reform : the …Why Most Developing Countries Should Not Try New Zealand's Reforms (1998)Why Most Developing Countries…Controlling Fiscal Corruption (1997)Controlling Fiscal CorruptionAuditing without Commitment (1997)Auditing without CommitmentAfrica's management in the 1990s and beyond (1996)Africa's management in the 19…Renegotiation Design with Unverifiable Information (1994)Renegotiation Design with Unv…A theory of incentives in procurement and regulation (1994)A theory of incentives in pro…Taxes and Bribery: The Role of Wage Incentives (1993)Taxes and Bribery: The Role o…Collusion in Hierarchical Agency (1993)Collusion in Hierarchical Age…Optimal Auditing, Insurance, and Redistribution (1989)Optimal Auditing, Insurance, …Hierarchies and Bureaucracies: On the Role of Collusion in Organizations (1986)Hierarchies and Bureaucracies…Regulation, Asymmetric Information, and Auditing (1984)Regulation, Asymmetric Inform…Regulating a Monopolist with Unknown Costs (1982)Regulating a Monopolist with …Optimal contracts and competitive markets with costly state verification (1979)Economically Optimal Performance Evaluation and Control Systems (1980)Rents, Competition, and Corruption (1999)The Theory of Incentives: The Principal-Agent Model (2001)Incentives and Organizations in the Public Sector: An Interpretative Review (2002)Specification Tests in Econometrics (1978)Econometric Analysis of Cross Section and Panel Data (2001)Do Lenders Favor Politically Connected Firms? Rent Provision in an Emerging Financial Market (2005)Eight Questions about Corruption (2005)Monitoring Corruption: Evidence from a Field Experiment in Indonesia (2007)American Economic Review (2019)The other path: the invisible revolution in the third world (1990)The spirit of reform : managing the New Zealand state sector in a time of change (1996)The new contractualism (1997)New Public Management Is Dead--Long Live Digital-Era Governance (2005)Toward A Second-Generation Theory of Fiscal Federalism (2005)What Is Governance? (2013)Political Order in Changing Societies (1970)Income tax evasion: a theoretical analysis (1972)The Nash Bargaining Solution in Economic Modelling (1986)A free press is bad news for corruption (2002)Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result (1973)Prices vs. Quantities (1974)Incentive Compatibility and the Bargaining Problem (1979)Using Cost Observation to Regulate Firms (1986)Online Consumer Review: Word-of-Mouth as a New Element of Marketing Communication Mix (2008)Markets and Hierarchies: Analysis and Antitrust Implications. (1976)The Social Psychology of Organizations. (1979)An Evolutionary Theory of Economic Change. (1983)The Industrial Organization of Congress; or, Why Legislatures, Like Firms, Are Not Organized as Markets (1988)Agency costs and innovation (1989)Multitask Principal–Agent Analyses: Incentive Contracts, Asset Ownership, and Job Design (1991)Vertical Integration, Appropriable Rents, and the Competitive Contracting Process (1978)Transaction-Cost Economics: The Governance of Contractual Relations (1979)Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model (1982)The Management of Innovation (1994)Incomplete Contracts: Where do We Stand? (1999)Chapter 8 The Economics of Fairness, Reciprocity and Altruism – Experimental Evidence and New Theories (2006)Politics and the effectiveness of foreign aid (1996)Spatializing States: Toward an Ethnography of Neoliberal Governmentality (2002)Institutions and Ethnic Politics in Africa (2005)Toward a new economics of science (1994)Crossing the great divide: Coproduction, synergy, and development (1996)Closed-Loop Supply Chain Models with Product Remanufacturing (2004)Auctions for conservation contracts: an empirical examination of Victoria's BushTender trial (2003)Detrimental effects of sanctions on human altruism (2003)The company of strangers: a natural history of economic life (2004)
this work references cited by second hop

References

  • 2009The State in Africa: The Politics of the Belly2,862 cited
  • 1994A theory of incentives in procurement and regulation2,653 cited
  • 2002The Theory of Incentives2,150 cited
  • 1982Regulating a Monopolist with Unknown Costs1,724 cited
  • 1986Hierarchies and Bureaucracies: On the Role of Collusion in Organizations1,227 cited
  • 2004Local Capture: Evidence from a Central Government Transfer Program in Uganda1,072 cited
  • 1989Optimal Auditing, Insurance, and Redistribution583 cited
  • 1993Taxes and Bribery: The Role of Wage Incentives582 cited
  • 1994Renegotiation Design with Unverifiable Information572 cited
  • 1998Why Most Developing Countries Should Not Try New Zealand's Reforms554 cited
  • 1996Africa's management in the 1990s and beyond407 cited
  • 1993Collusion in Hierarchical Agency407 cited
  • 1984Regulation, Asymmetric Information, and Auditing380 cited
  • 1997Auditing without Commitment206 cited
  • 2000Economic policy reform : the second stage173 cited
  • 1997Controlling Fiscal Corruption166 cited

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